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The spread of the recent pandemic, COVID-19—which began 
in Wuhan, in December of 2019—has created an unprecedented 
impact on public health in the United States and across the 
world. As of October 2021, the United States reported over 44 mil-
lion infection cases and over 720,000 deaths. Those cases repre-
sent over 18 percent of the reported infection cases in the world, 
whereas the population of the United States is less than four per-
cent of the world population. The United States has not been suc-
cessful in managing this pandemic and stopping its spread effec-
tively even though it has the largest medical, financial, and 
administrative resources in the world. This article analyzes the 
legal and institutional causes of this failure and explores possible 
remedies in three areas: provision of public healthcare to combat 
the pandemic; the regulation of public conduct to prevent the 
spread of the pandemic; and public access to information. The 
article also calls for a new approach; it explains why a law and 
development approach is relevant and applies the General Theory 
of Law and Development to assess the proposed remedies. The ar-
ticle advocates for law and institutions as remedies to fill the gaps 
created by ineffective political leadership in the management of 
COVID-19. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The current global pandemic of a coronavirus (SARS-CoV-
2)—which began in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 
(hereinafter “COVID-19”)—has had an unprecedented impact on 
public health in the United States and around the world. As of 
August 18, 2021, there were over 44.8 million cases and nearly 
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720,000 deaths in the United States.1 The pandemic has also 
resulted in enormous economic and social costs: unemployment 
reached unprecedented levels with more than 40 million 
unemployment benefit claims filed2 and the unemployment rate 
peaked at 14.7 percent, higher than any previous period since 
the Second World War.3 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimated in May 2020 that the gross domestic product (GDP) 
would be $3.9 trillion lower over the 2020–2021 period than the 
January 2020 estimates.4   
The United States has failed to manage COVID-19, as 
evidenced by its large numbers of infections and deaths.5 The 
number of infection cases in the United States accounts for over 
18 percent of the reported infection cases across the world,6 
whereas the population of the United States is around 4 percent 
of the world population.7 The rate of infection, 13.6 percent of 
                                                          
 1. COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(Aug. 16, 2021), https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends_dailycases 
[https://perma.cc/RG3J-TA2K] [hereinafter COVID Data Tracker]. 
 2. Mathieu Despard et al., COVID-19 Job and Income Loss Leading to 
More Hunger and Financial Hardship, BROOKINGS (July 13, 2020), https://www
.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/13/covid-19-job-and-income-loss-leading-
to-more-hunger-and-financial-hardship/ [https://perma.cc/N4N2-7L3Z]. 
 3. Elizabeth Weeks, Private Insurance Limits and Responses, in 
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-1 95, 95 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 2020), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5956e16e6b8f5b8c45f1c216/t/5f4d657822
5705285562d0f0/1598908033901/COVID19PolicyPlaybook_Aug2020+Full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WQ2H-B4G3] (describing the effect of the COVID-19 
pandemic on unemployment rates and the pandemic’s relation to the private 
insurance market). 
 4. Letter from Phillip Swagel, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, 
Speaker of the House, U.S. House of Representatives (June 9, 2020) (on file with 
Congressional Budget Office), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2020-06/56395-
CBO-Pelosi-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8FL-JB7H]. 
 5. Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in 
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 1. 
 6. See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (showing United States COVID-
19 cumulative cases which was approximately 44.8 million on October 18, 2021); 
WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
(Aug. 16, 2021), https://covid19.who.int/ [https://perma.cc/P7SV-QXAS] 
(showing worldwide COVID-19 cumulative cases: approximately 240 million on 
October 18, 2021). 
 7. See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://w
ww.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2021) (showing the United States 
population on October 18, 2021, was 332,854,281); International Data Base 
(IDB), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/idb/#
/country?COUNTRY_YR_ANIM=2021&menu=countryViz&COUNTRY_YEAR
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the population as of October 18, 2021, was 20.6 times higher 
than the infection rate of South Korea, 0.66 percent of the 
population.8 This outcome is baffling considering the vast 
medical, financial, and administrative resources that the United 
States has at its disposal and several measures that it has taken, 
including travel restrictions imposed in January 2020, the 
declaration of a national emergency and enactment of COVID-
19 legislation in March, stay-at-home orders imposed by early 
April in most states,9 and the availability of vaccines to most of 
the population since the spring of 2021.10 
All these efforts did not effectively work to control the 
spread of the pandemic, as there was a crucial missing link: the 
United States failed to conduct timely testing, contact tracing, 
quarantine, and treatment (TCQT) that was critically important 
to control the spread of the disease (and minimize subsequent 
deaths)11 in the first few crucial weeks of the pandemic, in the 
                                                          
=2021 (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) (showing midyear world population of 
7,772,850,805). 
 8. The rates are calculated from the infection cases as of October 18, 2021. 
See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1; Coronavirus Disease-19 (COVID-19), 
Republic of Korea, KOREA DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION AGENCY (Oct. 18, 
2021), http://ncov.mohw.go.kr/ [https://perma.cc/S2AA-EKS6] [hereinafter 
Coronavirus in Korea] (showing cumulative cases on October 18, 2021 was 
343,445); The World Factbook: South Korea, CENT. INTEL. AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-south/#people-and-soci
ety (last updated Sept. 22, 2021) (estimating July 2021 South Korea population 
of 51,715,162). 
 9. Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal, State, 
and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-
19, supra note 3, at 10–19. 
 10. See Julie Bosman & Lauren Leatherby, U.S. Coronavirus Death Toll 
Surpasses 700,000 Despite Wide Availability of Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/01/us/us-covid-deaths-700k.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/JKQ2-MD6S] (detailing how the United States reached the 
milestone of 700,000 COVID deaths despite the vaccines being widely 
availability for months). 
 11. There is widespread agreement that test-trace-isolate (quarantine) is 
the bare minimum for an effective pandemic response. See, e.g., Selina Rajan, 
Jonathan Cylus & Martin McGee, Successful Find-Test-Trace-Isolate-Support 
Systems: How to Win at Snakes and Ladders, 26 EUROHEALTH 34, 34 (2020) 
(“Any country thinking of easing COVID-19 lockdowns must be confident that 
they have a robust system in place to find, test, trace, isolate, and support 
(FTTIS) new cases.”). Reports also confirm that countries that adopted a test, 
track, and treat approach gained an early edge against COVID-19. Test, Track, 
Treat, GLOB. HEALTH NOW, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 
(Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.globalhealthnow.org/2020-04/test-track-treat [https
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months of February 2020 through early March 2020.12 Facing 
the unprecedented pandemic, the Trump administration failed 
to ensure that a sufficient number of test kits were made 
available for those who needed testing.13 By comparison, in late 
February, South Korea was testing more than 10,000 people 
each day, reportedly four times the number that the United 
States had tested over the previous one and a half months.14 By 
mid-March, when the number of infections was sharply 
increasing in the United States,15 South Korea had tested more 
than a quarter-million people, whereas the United States had 
                                                          
://perma.cc/3XCG-G9QL]. The value of therapeutic treatment can be marginal, 
particularly for patients with mild symptoms or asymptomatic patients, but it 
is more important for patients with more serious conditions. Interim Clinical 
Guidance for Management of Patients with Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 
(COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 16, 2021), 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/clinical-guidance-management
-patients.html [https://perma.cc/MC4U-EFVA]. Treatment is, thus, an essential 
component of disease control, the notion that includes recovery of patients from 
the disease. 
 12. See Michael D. Shear et al., The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test 
Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/UV3-
QZL8]. A recent article suggests, based on evidence, that limited United States 
community transmission likely began in late January or early February 2020 
when there was no extensive testing or contact tracing in place. Michelle A. 
Jorden et al., Evidence for Limited Early Spread of COVID-19 Within the United 
States, January–February 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 680, 
680 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6922e1.htm?s_c
id=mm6922e1_w [https://perma.cc/YC2R-RMB2]; see also Lindsay Maizland & 
Claire Felter, Comparing Six Health-Care Systems in a Pandemic, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/comparing-
six-health-care-systems-pandemic [https://perma.cc/36LA-DRQ4]; cf. Sean 
Fleming, South Korea’s Foreign Minister Explains How the Country Contained 
COVID-19, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.weforum.org
/agenda/2020/03/south-korea-covid-19-containment-testing/ [https://perma.cc/V
PS4-4QQ8] (summarizing South Korea’s efforts to battle COVID-19 through a 
rapid and extensive testing plan). 
 13. Shear et al., supra note 12. 
 14. Matt Berger, How South Korea Successfully Battled COVID-19 While 
the U.S. Didn’t, HEALTHLINE (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/heal
th-news/what-south-korea-has-done-correctly-in-battling-covid-19 [https://per
ma.cc/XU8J-F3D7]. 
 15. COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (charting cumulative cases per day 
dating back to January 2020). Since the first suspected case of COVID-19 in the 
United States on January 19, 2020, the number of cumulative cases increased 
to 1,661 on March 5; 11,837 on March 15; 100,580 on March 25; and 406,788 on 
April 6. Id. 
6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 23:1 
 
tested fewer than 60,000 people.16 Not only South Korea but 
virtually every other OECD country that had more than one-
hundred COVID-19 infection cases by mid-March (except 
Mexico) tested more than the United States (per thousand).17 
Without sufficient tests to identify those infected, contact 
tracing could not be effectively performed, and no extensive 
contact tracing system was in place, allowing for rapid 
transmission of the disease.18 Isolation and quarantine were left 
to the discretion of infected individuals and others who may have 
contracted the virus, without any mechanism for enforcement or 
monitoring in place. As to treatment, successful countries, such 
as South Korea, isolated all COVID-19 patients, categorized 
them into one of two groups—one for patients with mild or no 
symptoms and the other for patients with more serious 
conditions—and treated the former in Community Treatment 
Centers (CTCs)19 (residential clinics converted from existing 
facilities) and the latter in hospitals.20 By contrast, this type of 
isolated care was available in the United States only to patients 
with serious conditions; patients with mild or no symptoms had 
to wait at home until their conditions deteriorated enough to be 
admitted for such care or until they recovered, risking the spread 
of the disease to others during the unmonitored wait.21 
                                                          
 16. Rebecca Ballhaus, U.S. vs. South Korea: Behind the Coronavirus 
Testing Numbers, WALL ST. J. (May 12, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s
-vs-south-korea-behind-the-coronavirus-testing-numbers-11589324531 [https:/
/perma.cc/5NXV-ZFWM]. 
 17. Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19), OUR WORLD IN DATA, https://ourw
orldindata.org/coronavirus-testing [https://perma.cc/K88Z-6KUU] (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2020). 
 18. See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (showing the increase in 
COVID-19 infections). 
 19. Won Suk Choi et al., Community Treatment Centers for Isolation of 
Asymptomatic and Mildly Symptomatic Patients with Coronavirus Disease, 
South Korea, 26 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 2338, 2338 (2020), https://dx
.doi.org/10.3201/eid2610.201539 [https://perma.cc/2QHK-PAWK]. 
 20. In December 2020, South Korea also started to show a lack of hospital 
beds for COVID-19 patients. Thomas Maresca, South Korea Hits New COVID-




 21. The CDC guidelines have recommended that COVID-19 patients with 
mild symptoms “stay home” (except to get medical care), but there is no 
apparent provision for enforcement of quarantine, monitoring, or treatment of 
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Without effective testing (both lack of sufficient test kits and 
effective test protocols), contact tracing, and quarantine,22 the 
number of infections increased rapidly in early March 2020,23 
prompting states to issue stay-at-home orders24 to slow the 
spread of the virus and to buy time to secure needed medical 
resources and facilities.25 The infection curve began to flatten in 
early April26 when most states had stay-at-home orders in 
place,27 but the weeks under such orders (i.e., closure of 
businesses except those deemed “essential”)28 put enormous 
economic pressure on businesses, causing a record number of job 
                                                          
these patients with milder symptoms. What to Do If You Are Sick, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov
/if-you-are-sick/steps-when-sick.html#:~:text=Stay%20home.,Do%20not%20v
isit%20public%20areas [https://perma.cc/6YQD-CZD8] (last updated Sept. 11, 
2020). 
 22. The term “quarantine” traditionally has not been applied to people who 
were infected, but the term includes the notion of “isolation” that is applied to 
patients. Quarantine v. Isolation, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/easy-to-read/COVID-19-Quarantin
e-vs-Isolation.html#:~:text=Quarantine%20Helps%20Slow%20the%20Spread
,people%20in%20their%20home (last updated Jan. 8, 2021). 
 23. See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (showing increasing infection 
cases from early March to early April). 
 24. Stay-at-home orders, lockdown orders, or shelter-in-place orders 
restrict the movement of individuals. These terms are used interchangeably 
throughout this article without distinction. For a discussion of lockdown orders 
imposed by states, see Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the 
Federal, State, and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL 
RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 10–19. 
 25. See id. at 12. 
 26. COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1. 
 27. Amanda Moreland et al., Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 
Stay-at-Home Orders and Changes in Population Movement — United States, 
March 1–May 31, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1198, 1200 
fig.1 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935a2.htm [https://
perma.cc/Y3TW-BVAC]. 
 28. Essential businesses include utilities, gas stations, hospitals, grocery 
stores, pharmacies, and others that are considered essential for maintaining 
life. See, e.g., Margaret A. Honein et al., Summary of Guidance for Public Health 
Strategies to Address High Levels of Community Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 
and Related Deaths, December 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 
1860, 1864 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6949e2.htm 
[https://perma.cc/D7QN-X5BL] (“Essential (critical infrastructure) workers 
include health care personnel and employees in other essential workplaces (e.g., 
first responders and grocery store workers).”). 
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losses.29 As the stay-at-home orders were lifted in many states 
and the summer began, the number of infections started to soar 
in June 2020.30 The center of the pandemic also moved from the 
Northeast United States to the South (Georgia, Texas, and 
Florida) and West (California).31 At the time of writing, the 
number of infection cases across the United States has passed 
another peak, reaching 192,211 new cases on September 1, 2021 
(despite the availability of vaccines), which was substantially 
higher than in the period from March to August 2020 (peaked at 
78,252 infection cases on July 17, 2020).32 As of October 2021, 
over 40 percent of the United States population has not been 
fully vaccinated,33 creating the risk of further spread of the 
disease and mutation of the virus such as the Delta and Lambda 
variants.34 
This article examines the legal and institutional issues in 
the management of the pandemic in the United States. Other 
countries that have controlled the pandemic more successfully 
were more effective in TCQT in the early stages of the 
pandemic.35 For example, South Korea, thanks to an intense 
TCQT campaign in the first few weeks of the pandemic, never 
resorted to economically burdensome measures such as stay-at-
home orders but successfully controlled the spread of the disease 
                                                          
 29. In April 2020 alone, over 20.5 million jobs were lost. Payroll 
Employment Down 20.5 Million in April 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS (May 12, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2020/payroll-employ
ment-down-20-point-5-million-in-april-2020.htm [https://perma.cc/ZA2J-27D
M]. 
 30. See COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (showing an increase in daily 
average cases in June). 
 31. See id. (charting daily new case rate per 100,000 people in HHS Regions 
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9). 
 32. See id. 
 33. As of October 17, 2021, 42.8 percent of the population has not been fully 
vaccinated. U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker: See Your State’s Progress, MAYO 
CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/coronavirus-covid-19/vaccine-tracker 
[hereinafter U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker]. 
 34. According to reports, the available vaccines may not be fully effective 
against the Delta and Lambda variants. See Nancy Lapid, Delta Infections 
Among Vaccinated Likely Contagious; Lambda Variant Shows Vaccine 
Resistance in Lab, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/h
ealthcare-pharmaceuticals/delta-infections-among-vaccinated-likely-contagiou
s-lambda-variant-shows-vaccine-2021-08-02/. 
 35. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 12; Berger, supra note 14; Ballhaus, supra 
note 16. 
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at a much lower level.36 In South Korea, laws not only authorize 
but require the government to provide testing and treatment for 
infectious diseases and to cover the costs.37 There was also a 
publicly trusted disease control center in South Korea, Korea 
Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA, formerly The 
Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), supported 
by political leaders, including the President of the country, 
functioning as an institutional command center that guided the 
implementation of TCQT.38 
On the contrary, the laws and institutions in the United 
States have failed to function effectively to control the spread of 
the disease at an acceptable level. The President has vast 
statutory powers to adopt measures necessary to mandate TCQT 
under the Public Health Services Act (PHSA),39 but the Trump 
administration failed to coordinate effectively with state and 
local governments40 to implement TCQT in a timely manner.41 
Former President Trump downplayed the risk of the pandemic 
and encouraged premature re-opening of schools and businesses 
to minimize the economic impact of the disease, which was 
expected to affect his presidential re-election in November 
                                                          
 36. As of October 18, 2021, South Korea had a 0.66 percent per capita 
infection rate (343,445 infected in a population of roughly 51.71 million), a small 
fraction of the 11.2% per capita infection rate in the United States (37.2 million 
infected in a population of roughly 332.6 million). Compare Coronavirus in 
Korea, supra note 8, with COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (illustrating the 
infection numbers per capita in each country). 
 37. Specifically, the law provides that “[e]ach citizen shall have the right to 
receive the diagnosis and medical treatment of any infectious disease under this 
Act at a medical institution, and the State and local governments shall bear 
expenses incurred therein.” Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, Act 
No. 17475, Aug. 12, 2020, art. 6(3) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation 
Research Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do 
(search required). 
 38. See About KDCA, KOR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION AGENCY, http
://www.kdca.go.kr/contents.es?mid=a30101000000 [https://perma.cc/7MTB-YP
GU] (last updated Sept. 11, 2020). 
 39. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300mm–61 (codified provisions of the 
PHSA). 
 40. Throughout this paper, the term “local government” includes tribal 
governments of Indigenous Native Americans. 
     41. See Lindsay Wiley et al., Health Reform Reconstruction, 55 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 34–35), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3760086 [hereinafter Health Reform Reconstruction]. 
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2020.42 The split authority between the federal and the state and 
local governments, which are characteristic of the United States 
federal legal structure, did not allow a consistent and effective 
response to COVID-19 throughout the nation without strong 
political leadership at the presidential level.43 
Some attribute the failure to bad politics and characterize 
the failed COVID-19 management as a political failure,44 rather 
than an institutional failure, but it is an institutional failure; 
i.e., effective laws and institutions are functional in the 
prevailing political reality. Such laws and institutions reduce 
the adversarial political effects, even though they may not 
operate completely outside politics and increase chances for 
success. Laws and institutions that fail to do so, such as those 
currently operating in the United States, require adjustments 
and reform. The administration may have changed, but there is 
no assurance against the recurrence of dysfunctional politics. 
Also, the sluggish vaccination campaign, which has left a large 
portion of the population unvaccinated,45 indicates that there is 
a fundamental structural issue regardless of politics and the 
change of the administration. The gaps and flaws of the current 
laws and institutions must be identified, and necessary 
adjustments must be made to improve their effectiveness in the 
political reality that we have experienced. 
                                                          
 42. Brian Bennett, Why Coronavirus May Be the Biggest Threat Yet to 
Donald Trump’s Re-election, TIME (Mar. 10, 2020), https://time.com/5800093/co
ronavirus-donald-trump-2020-election [https://perma.cc/Q6C3-FKYF]; see 
Anita Kumar & Nicole Gaudiano, Trump Wants to Reopen Schools. Hint: It’s 
Not Just About Education, POLITICO (July 8, 2020), https://www.politico.com/ne
ws/2020/07/08/trump-reopen-schools-353245 (discussing Donald Trump’s plan 
to prematurely reopen schools to help boost the economy); see also John E. 
Owens, Donald Trump’s Re-election Prospects, 11 POL. INSIGHT 8, 8 (2020), ht
tps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2041905820958815?journalCode=pl
ia [https://perma.cc/Y6EB-87CR] (analyzing the effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic, along with other factors, on Donald Trump’s reelection prospects). 
 43. Lindsay F. Wiley, Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response, in 
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 65–70 [hereinafter 
Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response]. 
 44. See, e.g., George Pearkes, America’s COVID Response Was Always 
Doomed to Fail, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com
/us-covid-19-response-destined-fail-because-political-economic-system-2020-10 
(analyzing America’s COVID-19 response as a “function of pre-COVID political 
economy”). 
 45. As of October 17, 2021, over 40 percent of the population has not been 
fully vaccinated. U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker, supra note 33. 
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Part I of the article analyzes structural problems in three 
areas: healthcare provision in the context of the pandemic; 
regulation of conduct for disease control; and public access to 
information. Part II examines the current legal and institutional 
frameworks for healthcare (as applied to the pandemic 
management) and public access to information. The regulatory 
gaps in the current frameworks necessitate reform. The article 
calls for a new approach to resolve these problems. Part III 
discusses the relevance of the law and development approach to 
addressing the problems associated with COVID-19 
management and introduces the recently-developed General 
Theory of Law and Development (the General Theory) as a new 
analytical device to assess the impact of the proposed reform. 
Part IV applies the General Theory46 and assesses such impact 
against its analytical factors, such as regulatory design, 
regulatory compliance, and the quality of implementation. Part 
V draws conclusions. 
I. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS 
A. COPING WITH COVID-19 UNDER THE PRIVATE HEALTHCARE 
SYSTEM 
To combat COVID-19 effectively, there must be unfettered 
access to necessary medical services, including diagnostic tests 
and treatment. The United States is known to possess the 
world’s most advanced medical technology, highly trained 
medical professionals, and state-of-the-art facilities and 
equipment, but its patchwork delivery system has exposed flaws 
and weaknesses, particularly in the course of this unprecedented 
pandemic.47 
                                                          
 46. Section III.B infra introduces the General Theory; see also Yong-Shik 
Lee, General Theory of Law and Development, 50 CORNELL INT’L L. REV. 415, 
423–56 (2017) [hereinafter Gen. Theory] (discussing the background and 
framework of the General Theory of law and development); YONG-SHIK LEE, 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 38–61 (2019) [hereinafter 
THEORY AND PRACTICE] (introducing the framework and basic elements of the 
General Theory of law and development). 
 47. See Weeks, supra note 3, at 95 (“The COVID-19 pandemic exposed a 
number of existing flaws in the United States’ patchwork approach to paying 
for and providing access to medical care.”); see also Health Reform 
Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 34 (“The U.S. response to the COVID 
pandemic was dependent on an incoherent and inequitable state-by-state 
12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 23:1 
 
Unlike most other industrialized countries, which maintain 
publicly-funded, universal healthcare systems, the United 
States maintains a predominantly private healthcare system.48 
In 2019, private insurance programs covered 55.5 percent of the 
population,49 and supplementary public healthcare coverages 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, applying only to select qualified 
groups (Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for low-income 
families and individuals), covered 34 percent at some point 
during 2019.50 Employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), with varied 
terms, premium rates, and coverages, command a plurality 
share in the insurance market—49.6 percent of Americans 
depended on ESI coverage in 2019.51 As a result, access to 
medical services varies widely among Americans, depending on 
the terms of their insurance. In 2019, the average annual 
                                                          
patchwork approach to distributing the burdens and benefits of public 
investments in health.”). Wiley et al. describe the problems caused by the 
predominantly private health care system in the pandemic response. They 
observe, “The privatized nature of the U.S.’s health care system has hampered 
the COVID pandemic response. A system that depends on private health 
financing lacks the breadth, capacity, and financial incentives to deliver 
widespread public health measures, such as testing or vaccination, at levels 
necessary to be effective and equitable. Instead, our private health insurance 
system creates cost-barriers to basic public health measures at every step.” Id. 
at 38. 
 48. See Chris Slaybaugh, International Healthcare Systems: The US Versus 
the World, AXENE HEALTH PARTNERS, https://axenehp.com/international-healt
hcare-systems-us-versus-world/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2021) (discussing the 
healthcare systems of industrialized countries and stating that “[t]he United 
States is the only industrialized country in the world that does not have 
Universal Health Coverage for all citizens.”). 
 49. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTi
meframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22
asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/LS96-FKN9] [hereinafter Health Insurance 
Coverage]. 
 50. Id. 9.2 percent of the population was uninsured in 2019. KATHERINE 
KEISLER-STARKEY & LISA N. BUNCH, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2019, at 3 (2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census
/library/publications/2020/demo/p60-271.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBX4-HANC]. 
For a review of the United States healthcare system, see LEIYU SHI & DOUGLAS 
A. SINGH, ESSENTIALS OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (5th ed. 2018) 
(providing an overview of the United States healthcare system and its primary 
characteristics); see also RAYMOND L. GOLDSTEEN ET AL., JONAS’ INTRODUCTION 
TO THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (9th ed. 2020) (providing a description of, 
and commentary on, the United States healthcare system). 
 51. Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 49. 
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premium for employer-based family coverage amounted to 
$20,576; for single coverage, $7,188.52 Employers contribute to 
the premium, but the rate of contribution varies.53 
The high cost of insurance premiums resulted in 29.6 
million Americans being uninsured in 2019.54 However, the 
number of uninsured individuals has substantially declined 
since the adoption of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) in 2010 that removed some of the barriers to obtaining 
health insurance, such as pre-existing condition exclusions, and 
created the government-sponsored Marketplace (subsidizing 
premium payments through a direct tax credit in accordance 
with income level).55 The ACA reform had its limits: without a 
public insurance option,56 it did not eliminate the uninsured who 
were not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare but could not afford 
even the subsidized premium available on the Marketplace. 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB 
v. Sebelius weakened another important ACA coverage strategy, 
which was to expand Medicaid to United States citizens and 
qualified non-citizens below 138 percent of the federal poverty 
level, by finding that states had an option, not an obligation, to 
expand Medicaid under the terms of the ACA.57 This resulted in, 
to date, thirty-eight states and Washington, D.C. expanding 
Medicaid and twelve states not expanding it.58 
                                                          
 52. Weeks, supra note 3, at 100. 
 53. See id. (detailing health insurance options for the unemployed). 
 54. KEISLER-STARKEY & BUNCH, supra note 50, at 3. 
 55. See Weeks, supra note 3, at 95–96 (discussing how the ACA reformed 
United States private insurance). 
 56. The ACA instead introduced the Consumer Operated and Oriented 
Plan (CO-OP) Program, which sought to increase market competition by 
offering nonprofit plans from insurers with “a strong consumer focus,” but many 
failed shortly after launch. Sabrina Corlette et al., WHY ARE MANY CO-OPS 
FAILING?: HOW NEW NONPROFIT HEALTH PLANS HAVE RESPONDED TO MARKET 
COMPETITION 7, 9 (2015), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/file
s/documents/___media_files_publications_fund_report_2015_dec_1847_corlette
_why_are_many_coops_failing.pdf [https://perma.cc/87E2-UMNM] (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 18042(c)(3)(C)). 
 57. Weeks, supra note 3, at 95; NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548–58 
(2012) (finding that mandating the Medicaid expansion provision of the 
Affordable Care Act exceeded Congress’s spending power under the 
Constitution). 
 58. Weeks, supra note 3, at 95. Missouri approved Medicaid expansion in 
the summer of 2020. Alex Smith, Missouri Voters Approve Medicaid Expansion 
Despite Resistance from Republican Leaders, NPR (Aug. 5, 2020) https://www.n
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The absence of a publicly-funded, universal healthcare 
system created uncertainty for public access to COVID-19 
testing and treatment.59 In the early weeks of the pandemic, 
when a large number of tests and treatment should have been 
made available to the public to contain the disease, unclarity 
concerning out-of-pocket cost60 discouraged the public, 
particularly those without insurance or with only limited 
coverages, from seeking testing and treatment, contributing to 
the failure to contain the disease in the early stages of the 
pandemic.61 In contrast, other countries operating a publicly-
funded universal healthcare system were able to confirm that 
the testing and treatment would be provided free of charge or at 
an affordable rate so that the cost concern would not impede the 
effort to contain the disease.62 




 59. See Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 15 (“[T]he 
diffusion of authority between levels of government, fragmented fiscal supports, 
and the many diverse providers in our largely privatized health care system 
have led to a U.S. failure to fairly allocate, adequately supply, or constrain 
prices for essential testing, therapeutics, and vaccines. Widespread public 
health measures may be delivered more effectively in countries with a 
centralized and unified public health care delivery system.”). 
 60. According to a report, a single symptomatic case of COVID-19 could cost 
an individual a median of $3,045 during the course of infection. Sarah M. 
Bartsch et al., The Potential Health Care Costs and Resource Use Associated 
With COVID-19 in the United States, 39 HEALTH AFF. 927, 929 (2020), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00426 [https://perma.cc/L
N7H-R8GH]. 
 61. See Dan Witters, In U.S., 14% With Likely COVID-19 to Avoid Care Due 
to Cost, GALLUP (Apr. 28, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/309224/avoid-
care-likely-covid-due-cost.aspx [https://perma.cc/PR2P-CMNS]. For example, 
some states’ websites, such as California (ca.gov) and Georgia (georgia.gov), 
made it clear that COVID-19 testing was free to patients, but others, including 
Minnesota (mn.gov) and North Dakota (nd.gov), did not make the information 
as clear. This was partly because there could be charges associated with visiting 
a doctor outside of the test, even though COVID-19 tests were supposed to be 
free. Federal and state governments referred individuals to their insurance 
companies to confirm costs. 
 62. See, e.g., Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, Act No. 17475, 
Aug. 12, 2020, art. 6(3) (S. Kor.), translated in Korea Legislation Research 
Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do (search 
required) (declaring that in South Korea the State has the responsibility to 
cover the cost of tests and treatment). 
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The limited availability of test kits in the early weeks of the 
pandemic, as well as the absence of a cure or vaccine, were as 
much an impediment as cost, so not all of the early failure can 
be attributed to the patchwork healthcare system in the United 
States. Moreover, adjustments were made to the law, such as a 
requirement that all ACA-compliant and other comprehensive 
group and non-group health insurance plans cover testing for 
detection or diagnosis of COVID-19 as well as vaccinations 
without cost-sharing.63 Another adjustment was a mandate that 
required reimbursement of hospital costs for the treatment of 
uninsured patients.64 Also, a substantial number of workers who 
had lost their jobs and ESI during the pandemic were able to 
obtain health insurance through the Marketplace and 
Medicaid.65 In addition, the ACA provided states with an option 
to expand Medicaid coverage,66 and most hospitals (i.e., all of the 
                                                          
 63. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) of 2020 §§ 
6001–6004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b–5, 1395l, 1396d(a)(3) (2020); Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) of 2020 § 3201 (amending 
FFCRA § 6001 to apply coverage without cost-sharing to out-of-network tests), 
§ 3203(a), 41 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2020). The Trump administration’s guidance 
on the CARES Act and FFCRA reduced the scope of coverage by requiring 
insurers to cover the costs of COVID-19 testing for “diagnostic purposes” and 
when deemed “medically appropriate” by an individual’s attending medical 
provider. See FAQs About Families First Coronavirus Response Act and 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act Implementation Part 43, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 5–6 (June 23, 2020), 
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/FFCRA-Part-43-FAQs.pdf (interpreting 
Section 6001 of the FFCRA to not cover COVID-19 testing unless medically 
appropriate and diagnostic, and excluding coverage for “testing conducted to 
screen for general workplace health and safety (such as employee ‘return to 
work’ programs), for public health surveillance for SARS-CoV-2, or for any other 
purpose not primarily intended for individualized diagnosis or treatment of 
COVID-19”). 
 64. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act § 
3211, § 42 U.S.C. 254b(r) (amended). Wiley et al. report the risk that an 
uninsured patient could nevertheless be charged for their COVID-19 care. 
Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 40. 
 65. See Weeks, supra note 3, at 99–100 (explaining that state insurance 
Marketplaces opened enrollment due to the pandemic and that “[i]n April 2020 
alone, Marketplace enrollment due to unemployment increased by 139% 
compared to April 2019”). 
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Medicare-participating hospitals) were not allowed to turn down 
patients requiring emergency care, including COVID-19 
patients, due to cost considerations.67 
These adjustments, however, were not sufficient to contain 
the pandemic. The costly split between federal and state 
authorities over healthcare and insurance regulation has caused 
further delay in removing uncertainty inherent in the patchwork 
system, blocking a uniform remedy in the early stages of the 
pandemic.68 The cost of COVID-19 treatment was not addressed 
by legislation; coverage limits, existing among private insurance 
plans, as well as cost-sharing requirements, remained 
applicable, with elements of “surprise” medical bills.69 In the 
absence of any federal initiative to provide universal coverage 
for testing and treatment of COVID-19,70 states may attempt to 
fill the gap by enacting broader COVID-19 coverage 
requirements.71 But federal preemption currently in place limits 
the effect of state reform: the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) precludes additional state 
requirements from application to self-insured ESI plans that 
cover the majority (60 percent) of people who receive insurance 
                                                          
7D (last updated Sept. 8, 2021); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) of 2010, § 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (amended) (2010). 
 67. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) of 1986, 
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2018); see also Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor 
Act (EMTALA) Requirements and Implications Related to Coronavirus Disease 
2019 (COVID-19) (Revised), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 30, 
2020), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/qso-20-15-hospital-cah-emtala-revis
ed.pdf [https://perma.cc/L735-QCGU] [hereinafter EMTALA Requirements]. 
 68. Nicole Huberfeld et al., Federalism Complicates the Response to the 
COVID-19 Health and Economic Crisis: What Can Be Done?, 45 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL’Y & L. 951, 951–52 (2020). 
 69. See Weeks, supra note 3, at 98; see also Mark Fendrick, COVID-19 Care 
is (Mostly) Free to Patients. Should Other Vital Care Be Too?, U. MICH. HEALTH 
LAB BLOG (May 19, 2020), https://labblog.uofmhealth.org/industry-dx/covid-19-
care-mostly-free-to-patients-should-other-vital-care-be-too [https://perma.cc/A
Y2S-LJ4N]. 
 70. The CARES Act required insurers to cover the cost of COVID-19 tests 
but did not impose a maximum amount that providers can charge for the tests, 
inviting price gouging. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act, § 3202, 42 U.S.C. § 256b. The funding made available through the 
FFCRA and CARES Act did not remove the cost uncertainty. 
 71. Some states, such as New Mexico, Massachusetts, Vermont, and 
Minnesota, have required health plans to limit or eliminate the cost of COVID-
19 treatment. Weeks, supra note 3, at 99. 
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through employers;72 thus, most ESI-insured individuals are 
covered by insurance plans not subject to state regulation, and 
state reform will not benefit them.73 
A broader initiative to expand access to healthcare services 
needs to be made at the federal level, but this is not to suggest 
that the federal government should completely overtake states’ 
authority over healthcare regulation, which would be neither 
feasible nor desirable, even during the current pandemic. 
However, it would have been entirely possible and even 
necessary for the federal government to provide, after extensive 
consultations with states, uniform guidelines on providing 
affordable access to testing and treatment and to coordinate with 
states to ensure that those in need have timely access to testing 
and treatment. Nevertheless, such political leadership and 
federal-state cooperation were lacking, and states—many with 
resource shortages—were left to deal with the pandemic 
situation without coordinated support from the federal 
government.74 The current impediment may call for a deeper 
overhaul of the healthcare system, such as the adoption of a 
public insurance option or a single-payer system that has 
operated successfully in other countries that have better 
handled the pandemic.75 The proposed reform will not opt for 
either of such options but will mandate more extensive federal 
government engagement on healthcare issues and facilitate 
closer coordination between federal and state authorities.76 
Lastly, the current healthcare system does not adequately 
address the disproportionate effect that the pandemic has on 
different racial and income groups.77 According to studies, racial 
minorities and low-income communities have an increased risk 
of hospitalization and death from COVID-19.78 Racial 
                                                          
 72. Id. at 97. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response, supra note 43, at 65; 
see also Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in 
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 2. 
 75. See Maizland & Felter, supra note 12. 
 76. This point is further explained in Section III.B infra. 
 77. See Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 15–16. 
 78. Wyatt Koma et al., Low-Income and Communities of Color at Higher 
Risk of Serious Illness if Infected with Coronavirus, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(May 7, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/low-
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minorities, for instance, reportedly require hospitalization at 
nearly five times the rate of white adults79 likely due, in part, to 
higher levels of underlying health conditions, such as obesity, 
asthma, and chronic metabolic diseases, including diabetes and 
cardiovascular disease.80 These health issues are often clustered 
in low-income communities due to environmental factors, such 
as air, water, and soil pollutants that exacerbate the 
complications of airborne viruses, including COVID-19.81 
Additional adverse factors include crowded housing conditions, 
jobs that cannot be performed remotely, inconsistent access to 
healthcare, and stress leading to weaker immunity.82 Minorities 
and lower-income groups, despite being at a higher risk of 
having more serious complications related to COVID-19, are 
more likely to avoid healthcare due to fears of out-of-pocket 
expenses—a conclusion demonstrated in a survey that shows 58 
percent of non-White respondents have concerns or “extreme” 
concerns about the out-of-pocket costs for COVID-19 treatment, 
“compared to 32 percent of white respondents.”83 The fear of 
healthcare costs exposes the weakness of the current system and 
necessitates reform. 
                                                          
income-and-communities-of-color-at-higher-risk-of-serious-illness-if-infected-
with-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/E43S-BL5R]. 
 79. COVID-19 Hospitalization and Death by Race/Ethnicity, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronav
irus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery/hospitalization-death-by-ra
ce-ethnicity.html [https://perma.cc/7SDS-77LX]. 
 80. See CDC, WEEK 26, COVID VIEW: A WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE SUMMARY 
OF U.S. COVID-19 ACTIVITY, 9–11 (June 27, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronav
irus/2019-ncov/covid-data/pdf/covidview-07-03-2020.pdf?utm_source=link_new
sv9&utm_campaign=item_316052&utm_medium=copy [https://perma.cc/D54Y
-6NWL] (collating increased rate of hospitalization among racial minorities 
with statistics on underlying medical conditions in hospitalized adults). 
 81. Katherine Bagley, Connecting the Dots Between Environmental 
Injustice and the Coronavirus, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 7, 2020), https://e360.yale
.edu/features/connecting-the-dots-between-environmental-injustice-and-the-co
ronavirus [https://perma.cc/7GX6-EXHM]. 
 82. Sherita Hill Golden, Coronavirus in African Americans and Other 
People of Color, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.hopkinsmed
icine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/covid19-racial-disparities 
[https://perma.cc/BR8J-24E3]. 
 83. Sara Heath, More Non-White Patients Dread Out-of-Pocket Costs for 
COVID-19, PATIENT ENGAGEMENT HIT (Aug. 4, 2020), https://patientengageme
nthit.com/news/more-non-white-patients-dread-out-of-pocket-costs-for-covid-1
9 [https://perma.cc/9XBP-M3R4]. 
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B. FRAGMENTED AUTHORITIES 
Fragmentations in authorities have caused another 
structural problem that impeded successful management of 
COVID-19. Successful control of the pandemic requires 
regulating individual conduct, such as the enforcement of stay-
at-home orders to reduce physical contact and buy time for the 
government to make preparations, social distancing to slow the 
spread of the disease, and face covering to protect the public from 
the virus.84 Although the United States federal system splits 
authorities that enforce these measures among federal, state, 
and local governments to create checks and balances, in the 
current pandemic, the system has created fragmentations and 
clashes among authorities, resulting in a lack of effective and 
coordinated response to the pandemic,85 which, in turn, 
contributed to the government’s ultimate failure to control the 
disease.86 This section examines government authorities on 
regulation of individual conduct and analyzes issues created by 
lack of coordination and subsequent conflicts among them. 
At the federal level, the government has the authority to 
impose quarantine and isolation, drawn from the Commerce 
Clause in the United States Constitution.87 Under Section 361 
of the PHSA, the Secretary of the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services (“HHS Secretary”) has the 
authority to take measures to prevent the entry and spread of 
communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United 
                                                          
 84. See Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal, 
State, and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO 
COVID-19, supra note 3, at 15 (cataloguing various measures taken to control 
the pandemic). 
 85. See Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 32, 35–38 
(observing that “[f]ederalism further divides authority for legal interventions in 
the pandemic response among federal, state, and local governments”). 
 86. See id. at 35 (“[T]he federal government shunted to states responsibility 
that they neither asked for nor could bear—functionally or financially.”). 
 87. The United States Supreme Court applies a broad interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause to control activity that has a “substantial economic effect” on 
interstate commerce, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124, 125 (1942), or if 
the cumulative effect of an act could affect interstate commerce, NLRB. v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37, 38 (1937). See also U.S. v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (“The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not 
confined to the regulation of commerce among the states [but also] extends to 
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of 
the power of Congress over it . . . .”). 
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States and among states.88 The authority for performing these 
functions on a daily basis has been delegated to the Director of 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the 
CDC may order the quarantine or isolation of specific 
individuals if it suspects infection.89 Although the issuances of 
such orders are rare,90 non-compliance is punishable by fines or 
imprisonment.91 
The statutory powers cited above provide the federal 
government with authority to impose travel restrictions. In 
January 2020, the President restricted the entry of all aliens 
who were physically within China during the preceding fourteen 
days.92 As of October 2020, several Presidential proclamations 
were in effect, restricting entry into the United States from 
China, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, Brazil, 
Iran, and scores of countries across continental Europe.93 
However, there is a controversy as to whether the federal 
government has the authority to impose a “national” quarantine; 
e.g., whether the federal government may directly place New 
                                                          
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2008). Originally, this statute conferred this power on 
the Surgeon General, but all statutory powers and functions of the Surgeon 
General were subsequently transferred to the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 8855 (June 25, 
1966), which became the HHS Secretary. 20 U.S.C. § 3508. 
 89. 42 C.F.R. §70.6(a) (2017). The CDC control is limited to diseases listed 
by President’s executive order. See generally Section II.A infra (outlining federal 
and state healthcare frameworks in general and during a pandemic). 
 90. Cf. Lauren Sloss, Quarantine and Travel: Strict Penalties, Rare 
Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/2
1/travel/quarantine-enforcement.html. 
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 271. 
 92. Proclamation No. 9984 of January 31, 2020, 85 Fed. Reg. 6709 (Jan. 31, 
2020) [hereinafter Proclamation 9984]. The President’s travel restriction relies 
on immigration laws—§§ 212(f) and 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA)—instead of § 361 of the PHSA. Proclamation 9984, at 6710. Compare 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1185(a), and 3 U.S.C. § 301 (INA provisions cited in 
Proclamation 9984), with 42 U.S.C. § 264 (PHSA provisions). Professor Polly 
Price opines that the President used immigration provisions to circumvent HHS 
and CDC involvement and rulemaking, which would be involved if he used 
PHSA provisions. Email from Polly J. Price, Asa Griggs Candler Professor of 
Law, Professor of Glob. Health, Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Jan. 26, 
2021, 9:11 PM) (on file with author). 
 93. Travelers Prohibited from Entry to the United States, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/corona
virus/2019-ncov/travelers/from-other-countries.html [https://perma.cc/2555-L2
3Y]. 
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York, New Jersey, and Connecticut residents under a 
quarantine.94 There is a view that quarantine within a state is 
an exclusive state power, not within the federal government’s 
authority; i.e., the federal quarantine power is limited to 
preventing the spread of communicable diseases into the country 
or across state lines.95 Regardless of the legal issue, it would be 
politically difficult for the federal government to bypass states 
and impose quarantines directly within state territories,96 
unless it is abundantly clear that the states in question are 
unable to control a massive spread of the pandemic beyond their 
state boundaries. 
States have the primary authority to enact and enforce 
quarantine laws under their police power.97 States may also 
declare their own state of emergency,98 under which governors 
are authorized to adopt a broad range of public policy measures, 
including quarantine and isolation mandates.99 State public 
health codes also delegate authority to local governments to 
adopt their own measures; for example, the Texas Public Health 
and Safety Code provides in part: 
The governing body of a municipality or the commissioners court of a 
county may enforce any law that is reasonably necessary to protect 
                                                          
 94. Brian Naylor, Fact Check: A Blanket National Quarantine Is Likely Not 
Legal, NPR (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/02/825293201/a-presid
ent-is-not-able-to-order-a-national-quarantine-experts-say [https://perma.cc/26
YE-G6B3]. 
 95. See Wendy E. Parmet & Michael S. Sinha, The Law and Limits of 
Quarantine, 385 NEW ENG. J. MED. e28, e28(1)–(2) (2020), https://www.nejm.or
g/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp2004211?articleTools=true [https://perma.cc/8M2F-A
37F]. 
 96. See Scott McDonald, NY Governor Cuomo Says a Federal Quarantine 
by Trump  Would be a ’Declaration of War,’ Trump Renegotiates, NEWSWEEK 
(Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/ny-governor-cuomo-says-federal-q
uarantine-ordered-trump-would-declaration-war-states-1494857 [https://perm
a.cc/7DLL-4BPC] (describing tension between President Trump and Governor 
Cuomo over a potential federal quarantine of New York, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut). 
 97. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of 
Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902). 
 98. See, e.g., Press Release, State of Georgia, Kemp Declares Public Health 
State of Emergency (Mar. 16, 2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2020
-03-16/kemp-declares-public-health-state-emergency [https://perma.cc/7MZB-
UFS7]. 
 99. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202 (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.governo
r.ny.gov/news/no-202-declaring-disaster-emergency-state-new-york [https://per
ma.cc/ML5J-3KBD]. 
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the public health . . . . The governing bodies of municipalities and the 
commissioners courts of counties may cooperate with one another in 
making necessary improvements and providing services to promote 
the public health . . . .100 
Split authority among federal, state, and local governments 
has raised controversies as to the legitimacy of the proposed and 
implemented government measures. Toward the end of March, 
when the pandemic was fast spreading in the Northeast United 
States, former President Trump reportedly discussed the 
possibility of a federal quarantine in the tri-state area of New 
York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.101 State governors resisted 
the idea, as well reflected by the New York State Governor’s 
comment that “[the imposition of the federal quarantine] would 
be a declaration of war on states. A federal declaration of war.”102 
Polly J. Price, an expert in health law and Professor of Law at 
Emory Law School, also opined that quarantine within a state is 
exclusively within the states’ power, where the quarantine does 
not involve entry into the country or cross-state movement but 
requires people to stay home or close business.103 The question 
is whether the federal government’s quarantines within state 
territories will qualify as measures to prevent the entry and 
spread of communicable diseases “from foreign countries into the 
States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any 
other State or possession.”104 The quarantines in question do not 
specifically target movements across the state borders and, 
therefore, are arguably outside the ambit of the law, despite the 
CDC’s statement that the federal government has quarantine 
powers.105 
There have also been disputes between state and local 
(municipal) authorities over the regulation of public conduct, 
such as face-covering requirements. The Governor of Georgia, for 
example, clashed with the Mayor of Atlanta regarding the 
Mayor’s enactment of a mask mandate in the city. Under the 
mask mandate proposed by the Mayor of Atlanta, failure to wear 
                                                          
 100. 2 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §121.003 (West 2015). 
 101. McDonald, supra note 96. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Polly J. Price, Do State Lines Make Public Health Emergencies 
Worse? Federal Versus State Control of Quarantine, 67 EMORY L. J. 491 (2018). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 105. Naylor, supra note 94. 
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a mask within Atlanta’s city limits was punishable by a fine and 
up to six months in jail.106 The Governor claimed that “the 
mayor’s [sic] mask mandate violated his emergency order 
prohibiting local action from being more prohibitive than the 
state’s requirements.”107 This dispute led to the Governor filing 
a lawsuit against the City of Atlanta and the Mayor, although 
he subsequently dropped the lawsuit.108 Conversely, the 
Governor of Nevada criticized and objected to the Mayor of Las 
Vegas re-opening casinos in late April when he and many of his 
supporters did not consider the City of Las Vegas to be ready for 
re-opening in the pandemic.109 
In a democracy, disagreements among authorities may 
emerge, and these types of checks and balances among the 
different layers of government are embedded in the Constitution 
and may well be justified during normal times; however, in this 
unprecedented pandemic, the disputes and clashes among 
federal, state, and local authorities confuse the public and 
undermine public confidence in the government’s control of the 
disease. The fragmentations between authorities could not have 
been conducive to ensuring a consistent and effective response 
to COVID-19 across the country. In the absence of strong federal 
leadership in the management of the current pandemic, federal, 
state, and local authorities lack coordination, leaving each state 
to deal with the pandemic largely on their own.110 The lack of 
precedents in a comparable-scale pandemic in recent decades 
                                                          
 106. Atl., Ga. Exec. Order No. 2020-113. 
 107. Devin Cole, Georgia Governor Withdraws Lawsuit Challenging Atlanta 
Mayor’s Mask Mandate, CNN (Aug. 13, 2020, 9:32 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/08/13/politics/brian-kemp-atlanta-mask-lawsuit-withdrawing/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/3QNL-WX5Q]. 
 108. Nicholas Reimann, Georgia Governor Drops Lawsuit Against Atlanta 




 109. Allyson Chiu, The Public Skewering of Las Vegas Mayor Carolyn 
Goodman, Champion of Reopening Casinos, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/04/23/las-vegas-mayor-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/6XPP-WPS9]. 
 110. Michael D. Shear et al., Inside Trump’s Failure: The Rush to Abandon 
Leadership Role on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18
/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-response-failure-leadership.html [https://perma
.cc/LXL9-PFLW] (last updated Sept. 15, 2020). 
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may have affected the poor coordination and low level of 
institutional readiness for the pandemic. To overcome the 
present fragmentation in authority, consideration should be 
given to a new institutional arrangement, such as a control 
center in charge of pandemic management, as discussed in 
Section III.A below. 
C. PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
Lastly, the third impediment in the management of COVID-
19 has been insufficient public access to information. Ensuring 
public access to information is considered to be a necessary 
response to the pandemic.111 The public will be made better 
aware of the situation and will be in a better position to protect 
themselves from the disease when they are granted unfettered 
access to necessary information, including: the status of the 
disease (e.g., the number and locations of infections and deaths); 
government response measures (e.g., stay-at-home orders, social 
distancing requirements, and mask-wearing mandates); public 
safety guidelines (e.g., hygiene recommendations); and 
availability of test sites, treatment, and vaccination.112 Some of 
the information acquired through contact tracing, such as the 
locations and dates of the visits by those infected, is also useful 
to the public in their efforts to assess the risk of exposure in their 
daily lives, particularly in the early stages of a pandemic where 
the number of infections is relatively limited. 
Public access to information will strengthen the ability of 
the public to combat the disease and improve their chances for 
survival through the pandemic. Ensuring public access to 
information will also enable the public to better understand the 
government’s decisions related to the pandemic, evaluate and 
debate the decision-making process, and propose improvements 
to the decisions. This process builds collaboration and trust 
between the government and the public, which is essential to 
effectively responding to a pandemic.113 The right to information 
enhances public access to it; this right, which will be examined 
                                                          
 111. Ensuring the Public’s Right to Know in the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
ARTICLE 19, at 4 (May 2020), https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/202
0/05/Ensuring-the-Publics-Right-to-Know-in-the-Covid-19-Pandemic_Final-13
.05.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU3G-A5XS]. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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further, is particularly beneficial in enabling medical experts, 
academics, and journalists to obtain the necessary information 
to inform the general public and advise the government to 
consider better alternatives. 
In the United States, the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) and its state equivalents114 facilitate the right to 
information. The right to information is also a fundamental 
component of the right to freedom of expression, as articulated 
by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.115 The U.N. Human Rights Committee has specified that 
states should proactively publish information of public interest 
and take steps to facilitate access to information held by public 
bodies by, inter alia, legislating freedom of information 
legislation.116 The United States federal and state FOIA models 
meet the latter recommendation, but the former part—proactive 
publication of information—is not generally required under 
federal or state laws.117 There is a need for the legal protection 
of this part of the right, which can be accomplished by requiring 
the government under the law to release the information about 
the pandemic promptly. 
The right to information can conflict with the right to 
privacy, particularly when the former extends to private 
information of individuals, such as information on the locations 
where infection cases are reported and the time and location of 
visits made by those infected with the virus in a recent time 
period. This information, which is obtained through contact 
tracing, would be important to contain the pandemic, as such 
information enables the public to take precautionary action. The 
information required through contact tracing, however, is 
private in nature, and any attempt to obtain such information, 
either by the government or the public, raises a privacy 
                                                          
 114. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018); see also GA. 
CODE. ANN. § 31-7-6 (2010); N.Y. PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW §§ 91–99 (McKinney 
2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.17(B)(4) (West 2004). 
 115. G.A. Res. 217(III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 19; and International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966), art. 19. 
 116. General Comment No. 34, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. on its 102nd 
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www2.ohchr.org/englis
h/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK8G-4D2H]. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 300u-3 (2018). 
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concern118: while the public needs to secure necessary 
information to combat the disease, the individual subject to 
contact tracing may not wish to provide private information to 
the government or to permit any part of the information to be 
released to the public. In a recent survey, most participants 
showed objection to publicly releasing contact tracing 
information.119 Reflecting this popular concern, contact tracing 
information is not released to the public in the United States. In 
several states, including Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, and Louisiana, bills have been introduced to ensure 
privacy and confidentiality for contact tracing and make 
participation voluntary, not mandatory.120 
The pro-privacy stance, currently taken by local legislatures 
and the general population,121 stems, at least in part, from the 
concern about the potential misuse of collected information. 
Such potential misuse would consist of any use of collected 
information for an unauthorized purpose. For example, a public 
release of private information obtained through contact tracing, 
such as an individual’s personal address, would be a misuse; 
another example of misuse would be the unauthorized use of 
contact tracing information by a third party, who may, for 
example, gain access to the information to develop an exposure 
tracing and notification app for the government, to learn the 
                                                          
 118. Congressional Research Service (CRS) has addressed the privacy issue 
in the context of digital contact tracing. ERIC N. HOLMES & CHRIS D. 
LINEBAUGH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10511, COVID-19: DIGITAL CONTACT 
TRACING AND PRIVACY LAW (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf
/LSB/LSB10511 [https://perma.cc/U3EE-YQNF]. In response to the privacy 
concern, the HIPAA provides for the protection of medical records and other 
personal health information and prevents disclosure without patient 
authorization. 45 C.F.R. pt. 160(A)–(E) (2020); and 45 C.F.R. pt. 164 (2020). The 
HIPAA also authorizes the release of personal medical information under 
emergency situations. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 119. LUCY SIMKO ET AL., COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING AND PRIVACY: 
STUDYING OPINION AND PREFERENCES 11 (May 8, 2020), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2
005.06056.pdf [https://perma.cc/98C8-KZJZ]. 
 120. Ass’n State & Territorial Health Officials, State and Territorial Contact 
Tracing Legislation, ISSUE BRIEF (July 2, 2020), https://www.astho.org/COVID-
19/State-and-Territorial-Contact-Tracing-Legislation/ [https://perma.cc/VW6T-
QYH4]. 
 121. Id.; see also SIMKO ET AL., supra note 119 (discussing public concerns 
between the need for technology-based contact tracing and maintaining 
privacy). 
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pattern of customer movements for a commercial purpose.122 The 
government use of contact tracing information for a purpose 
unrelated to the pandemic, such as to trace criminal suspects, 
enforcing immigration rules, and monitoring national security 
threats, could also be considered a misuse, despite the collateral 
benefits to the public.123 
Privacy rules embedded in existing federal and state laws 
and the new state bills seeking to strengthen the protection of 
privacy in the process of contact tracing124 will attempt to 
prevent such misuses, but the possibility of misuse cannot be 
eliminated by legal prescriptions alone. An external security 
breach is always a possibility; thus, security measures, such as 
a physical separation of the database that stores contact tracing 
information, might be necessary to reduce the possibility of a 
breach and potential misuse. Additional preventive measures 
may also be adopted to ensure the integrity of the process; for 
example, consideration should also be given to minimizing a line 
of reporting for the investigators who perform contact tracing 
and process contact tracing information, thereby minimizing the 
number of people who access the information. Contact tracing 
should also be subject to independent oversight and periodic 
reviews to ensure the protection of confidentiality and privacy in 
the process of contact tracing and the use of the information. 
Digital contact tracing, which instills anonymity in the collection 
of information and notification of exposure, may also reduce the 
                                                          
 122. Some states are using digital contact tracing technology created by IT 
companies such as Google and Apple, which relies on smartphones using 
Bluetooth to determine when devices are in close proximity. Robert A. Fahey & 
Airo Hino, COVID-19, Digital Privacy, and the Social Limits on Data-Focused 
Public Health Responses, 55 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 1 (Dec. 2020), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7328565/ [https://perma.cc/SD7
J-BTDF]. While this approach seeks to protect privacy, it is still subject to 
misuse. Id. at 2–3. 
 123. Thus, the New York State Legislature has passed companion bills 
A10500 and S8450C that would require that all information collected by 
COVID-19 contact tracers remain confidential and inaccessible to law 
enforcement without a court order. Ass’n State & Territorial Health Officials, 
supra note 120. See also Assembly Bill A10500C, N.Y. STATE SENATE, 
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/a10500/amendment/c [https://p
erma.cc/V8UT-NWZ5]; Senate Bill S8450C, N.Y. STATE SENATE, ht
tps://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s8450 [https://perma.cc/N5QH-3
R4E]. 
 124. Ass’n State & Territorial Health Officials, supra note 120. 
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possibility of misuse, although this technology also does not 
eliminate the privacy concerns.125 
There is a conflict between the right to information and the 
right to privacy in a pandemic situation, where the information 
sought pertains to individual privacy. In a pandemic, the society 
has to decide whether it is ready to accept certain limitations on 
privacy, along with the risk of misuse, by allowing the 
government to obtain personal information and use it in the 
interest of controlling the pandemic.126 The question is the 
extent of acceptable limitations on privacy and of allowable use 
by the government. The point of balance may vary by public 
preferences, social traditions, and cultural aspirations. In the 
United States, individualism prevailing in society has generated 
a strong preference for privacy, resulting in no public release of 
contact tracing information and the pro-privacy stance in contact 
tracing legislation.127 Participation in contact tracing is also 
made voluntary rather than mandatory.128 Considering the large 
number of infections and continuing deaths from COVID-19, 
efforts should be made to increase public access to information, 
including some of the information acquired by contact tracing 
while seeking to protect essential privacy (such as personal 
                                                          
 125. See HOLMES & LINEBAUGH, supra note 118 (discussing privacy issues 
in digital contact tracing). The concern about misuse is well reflected by the 
recent remarks of Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri, who opined that 
“Americans are right to be skeptical of this project . . . . Too often, Americans 
have been burned by companies who calculated that the profits they could gain 
by reversing privacy pledges would outweigh any later financial penalty.” Evan 
Halper, Lawmakers Warn Coronavirus Contact-Tracing is Ripe for Abusive 
Surveillance, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story
/2020-04-26/privacy-americans-trade-off-trace-coronavirus-contacts. 
 126. Yong-Shik Lee & Hye Seong Mun, COVID-19: Public Access to 
Information – Legal and Institutional Frameworks, 13 L. DEV. REV. 535, 539 
(2020). 
 127. See Ass’n State & Territorial Health Officials, supra note 120. For 
example, New York bill S8327 would make it unlawful to knowingly 
disseminate contact tracing information to an unauthorized person. Id. A New 
Jersey bill, A 4170, for another example, would limit the use of contact tracing 
data to contact tracing purposes and require the collected data to be deleted no 
later than 30 days after it is received. Id. 
 128. Id. See also Contact Tracing Resources for Health Departments, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-n
cov/php/contact-tracing/contact-tracing-resources.html [https://perma.cc/GX3W
-X9GG] [hereinafter Contact Tracing Resources for Health Departments] (last 
updated Sept. 1, 2020), (recommending voluntary, rather than mandatory, 
participation in contact tracing). 
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identities and addresses). The digital exposure notification apps 
currently used in the United States provide the subscribers with 
exposure alerts, but they have limits in that they do not provide 
the public with necessary information, such as time and location 
of visits made by those infected with COVID-19.129 
As seen in the preceding discussions, the structural flaws in 
healthcare provision in the United States, fragmented 
authorities in the regulation of public conduct (to prevent the 
spread of the disease), and insufficient public access to 
information impeded an effective response to the pandemic. 
These flaws necessitate a systemic reform, such as legal and 
institutional adjustments. An assessment of the current legal 
and institutional apparatus would be a necessary next step to 
identify the specific areas for reform. The following discussions 
examine the legal and institutional frameworks for healthcare 
(as applied to the pandemic) and public access to information for 
this purpose. 
II. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL APPARATUS 
The regulatory gaps in the current legal and institutional 
frameworks, such as lack of the mandatory provisions requiring 
the government to ensure timely access to TCQT or public access 
to information and lack of a politically-independent control 
center in charge of the pandemic management, have impeded 
pandemic management and require reform. Based on the 
examination of the current frameworks, Section III.A will 
propose specific legal and institutional reform. 
A. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HEALTHCARE 
1. Law   
In the United States, regulatory power over healthcare is 
shared among federal, state, and local governments.130 At the 
                                                          
 129. Several other countries that have successfully managed COVID-19, 
such as South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, have also collected and 
released the tracing information to the public, with details of the released 
information determined by pre-set guidelines. Mi Jung Park, COVID-19 
Tracing Investigation and Privacy, South Korea, 2020, BRIC VIEW STATUS REP. 
(2020). 
 130. Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Thinking Globally, Acting 
Locally – The U.S. Response to Covid-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2020; e75, 
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federal level, statutes such as the ACA,131 the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),132 and the Social 
Security Act,133 include operative provisions for healthcare in 
the United States. As discussed above, the ACA overhauled the 
United States healthcare system by removing some of the 
barriers to obtaining health insurance, such as pre-existing 
condition exclusions, and creating the government-sponsored 
Marketplace.134 The framers of the ACA also sought to expand 
Medicaid to increase coverage.135 The HIPAA provides, inter 
alia, the ability to transfer and continue health insurance 
coverage for American workers and their families when they 
change or lose jobs and also requires confidential handling of 
protected health information.136 The Social Security Act and its 
amendments provide for public coverages such as Medicare (for 
those over sixty-five years old and certain people with 
disabilities), Medicaid (for low-income individuals and families), 
and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP, for 
children in low-income families not qualified for Medicaid).137 
The absence of a universal healthcare system means that a large 
number of individuals without insurance (29.3 million as of 
2019)138 are not covered for medical treatment, except in 
emergencies: the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(EMTALA) requires hospitals that participate in Medicare 
(about 98 percent of hospitals in the United States) to provide 
emergency care, regardless of the individual’s insured status or 
                                                          
e75(1) (2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp2006740?articleTo
ols=true [https://perma.cc/BBE9-7V9G]. 
 131. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. 
(2018). 
 132. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 
42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2018). 
 133. Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2018). 
 134. See Weeks, supra note 3, at 95–96. 
 135. Id. at 95. 
 136. 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2018); 42 U.S.C. 1320d–6 (2018). 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2018); 42 U.S.C. 1397aa 
(2018). 
 138. Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 49. 
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ability to pay.139,140 Under the PHSA, the federal government 
also has a general mandate to assist states and local authorities 
in the prevention and suppression of communicable diseases and 
concerning other public health matters.141 Under the Commerce 
Clause authority, the federal government has authority for 
prevention and control of disease at the borders or interstate.142 
At the state level, laws grant state governments plenary 
authority concerning healthcare administration (to the extent 
that the authority is not preempted by federal law).143 Thus, 
laws reflect healthcare policy adopted by each state and regulate 
both public and private provision of healthcare through a variety 
of statutory mechanisms. For example, state laws regulate the 
professional practice of healthcare by requiring that all 
providers first obtain a license or permit before rendering 
medical service.144 State laws also provide for much of the 
funding to healthcare providers necessary for the operation of 
                                                          
 139. The EMTALA extends its treatment mandate to patients presenting 
with an “emergency medical condition,” as determined by an initial medical 
screening examination. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2018). The EMTALA allows the 
determination to be made “within the capability of the hospital’s emergency 
department.” Id. Once the hospital staff determines a patient has a legitimate 
emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide either the appropriate 
examination and treatment within the capability of “the staff and facilities 
available at the hospital” to stabilize the patient’s condition, or transfer to 
another medical facility under limited conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) 
(2018). 
 140. On March 9, 2020, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
issued a memorandum reaffirming hospitals’ obligation to provide access to 
emergency medical care for all those in need, including and especially patients 
suspected of infection. EMTALA Requirements, supra note 67. Under CMS’s 
guidance, emergency departments (EDs) may not “use signage that presents 
barriers to individuals who are suspected of COVID-19 from coming to the ED,” 
or “refuse to provide an appropriate [medical screening exam] to anyone who 
has come to the ED for examination or treatment of a medical condition.” Id. at 
5. When individuals are deemed infected, hospitals are expected to “isolate the 
patient immediately.” Id. 
 141. 42 U.S.C. §243(a) (2018). 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2018); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 143. Eileen Salinksy, Governmental Public Health: An Overview of State and 
Local Public Health Agencies, NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, Paper 244 (Aug. 
18, 2010), https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_centers_nhpf/244/. 
 144. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1253 (1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 
31-7-3; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-301 (2020); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH CODE § 3605 
(2019); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH CODE § 2801-a (2019). 
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medical facilities.145 Finally, state statutes provide for a 
comprehensive scheme for governmental oversight of healthcare 
facilities, personnel, and services.146 
At the local level, laws regulate healthcare only to the extent 
allowed by states, which have primary authority over 
healthcare.147 Thus, local laws are generally limited to the 
implementation and enforcement of state mandates on 
healthcare.148 For these reasons, there exists significant 
variation among local jurisdictions with respect to the scope of 
laws governing healthcare. In the realm of public health, local 
laws do, however, play a significant role in the public health code 
enforcement process by establishing within local governmental 
agencies powers of inspection, investigation, and adjudication of 
particular offenses.149 Local laws may impose recordkeeping and 
information-reporting requirements upon healthcare 
providers,150 which state and federal officials may then compile 
to better inform their public health policy decisions. 
During periods of a public health crisis, the following 
statutes empower the federal government to adopt emergency 
measures: the PHSA, the Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act), and the National 
Emergencies Act (the NEA).151 The PHSA serves as the primary 
                                                          
 145. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-1 (2009); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH CODE § 
2807-k (2020). Such funding is especially important for privately owned 
providers, which might not otherwise be able to afford to treat their indigent 
patients. 
 146. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-2.1 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1852 
(2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1854 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 250.03 (2009). 
 147. Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 65; see, e.g., ATLANTA, 
GA., MUN. CODE § 5-1 (2020). 
 148. See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-3-4 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2433 
(2020); W. VA. CODE § 16-2-11 (2020). 
 149. See Cook County, Ill. § 38-32 (2020); Fulton County, Ga. § 34-2 (2020); 
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY, KY. § 11-7 (2020); CHARLESTON, W. VA. § 58-1 
(2020). 
 150. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY, KY. § 11-7 (2020); PORTLAND, OR. § 
8.24.070 (2020). 
 151. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300mm–61 (2018); Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 et 
seq. (2018); National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2018). See also 
Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the Federal, State, and 
Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, 
supra note 3, at 10. 
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legal instrument for public health crises.152 Section 319 of the 
PHSA vests in the HHS Secretary broad legal authority to 
respond to such crises, including the powers to declare a public 
health emergency (PHE).153 Declaration of a PHE under the 
PHSA triggers multiple mechanisms in federal law by which 
public health officials can exercise broader discretion to 
effectively respond to the emergency. For example, Section 319 
of the PHSA empowers the HHS Secretary to make grants, 
provide awards for expenses, enter into contracts, and conduct 
and support investigations into the cause, treatment, or 
prevention of the disease or disorder.154 
The Stafford Act addresses several issues relating to 
disaster preparedness and response155 by ensuring an “orderly 
and continuing means of assistance” from federal to state and 
local governments.156 As for public health, the Stafford Act 
authorizes the President to provide technical and advisory 
assistance to affected state and local governments for public 
health and safety information, including dissemination of such 
information, provision of health and safety measures, and 
management, control, and reduction of immediate threats to 
public health and safety.157 The Act also authorizes the 
President to direct any federal agency to utilize its authorities 
                                                          
 152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300mm–61 (2018); U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Legal Authority, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, https://www.phe
.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/T99
P-R5EH] (last reviewed Sept. 18, 2019). 
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 247d (2018). 
 154. Id. Under Section 1135 of the Social Security Act, the HHS Secretary is 
authorized during a PHE to waive or modify certain Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, 
and HIPAA requirements to “ensure that sufficient health care services and 
providers are available during an emergency.” Nicole Huberfeld & Sidney 
Watson, Medicaid’s Vital Role in Addressing Health and Economic 
Emergencies, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 
105; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (2018). 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(a) (2018). Issues posed by disasters include loss of life, 
human suffering, loss of income, property loss and damage, and interruption of 
normal governmental functions and communities. Id. 
 156. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b) (2018). To achieve this primary objective, the 
Stafford Act empowers the federal government to i) revise and broaden the 
scope of existing disaster relief programs, ii) encourage state and local 
development of comprehensive disaster preparedness plans and hazard 
mitigation efforts, iii) facilitate increased intergovernmental coordination, and 
iv) provide economic assistance for disaster-related losses. Id. 
 157. 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(3) (2018). 
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and resources (including personnel, equipment, supplies, 
facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services) in 
support of state and local emergency assistance efforts to protect 
public health.158 The Act further imposes a duty upon the HHS 
Secretary to “set priorities and preparedness goals and further 
develop a coordinated strategy” to improve state, local, and 
hospital preparedness for and response to public health 
threats.159 
Recognizing the need for broader executive power during 
times of emergency, Congress enacted the NEA in 1976.160 The 
NEA empowers the President to declare a national 
emergency.161 Declaration of a national emergency under the 
NEA triggers latent emergency powers vested in the President 
by other statutes.162 For example, the President is authorized to 
waive confidentiality and certification requirements, sanctions, 
and other provisions as necessary to supply public health 
services.163 The President may also utilize the Public Health 
Service to the extent he deems necessary to “promote the public 
interest.”164 The NEA prescribes procedural safeguards: the 
President is required to specify existing statutory authority from 
which he derives his emergency power.165 Additionally, the NEA 
imposes reporting requirements upon the President to ensure 
                                                          
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 5192(a)(1) (2018). 
 159. 6 U.S.C. § 321g(a) (2018). 
 160. National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2018). 
 161. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2018). 
 162. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(b) (2018). 
 163. Social Security Act of 1935 § 1135, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5 (2018). 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 217 (2018). See Brennan Center for Justice, A Guide to 
Emergency Powers and Their Use (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.o
rg/our-work/research-reports/guide-emergency-powers-and-their-use [https://p
erma.cc/2HTC-3C4F]. 
 165. 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2018). For example, the President specifically invoked 
Section 1135 of the Social Security Act when he directed HHS Secretary Azar 
to “waive or modify certain requirements of the Medicare, Medicaid, and State 
Children’s Health Insurance programs and of the [HIPAA] Privacy Rule.” 
Proclamation 9994, 85 FED. REG. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020). 
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accountability.166 Congress may also terminate a President’s 
declaration of emergency by passing a joint resolution.167 
Under significant pressure to combat the rapid spread of 
COVID-19, Congress enacted additional statutes, including the 
Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA)168 and the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES 
Act).169 The FFCRA mandated that health insurers provide 
coverage and not impose any cost-sharing requirements 
(including deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance) or prior 
authorization or other medical management requirements for 
diagnostic COVID-19 testing and vaccination.170 The CARES Act 
also appropriated $1.3 billion in supplemental awards to 
healthcare providers to alleviate some of the financial burden 
associated with COVID-19.171 However, neither the FFCRA nor 
the CARES Act specifically requires healthcare providers to 
cover the cost of treatment. Rather, these legislative efforts seek 
to broaden access to healthcare services by removing financial 
barriers to testing for patients and by dispensing over $1 billion 
in federal funding to healthcare providers, thus increasing their 
capabilities as it relates to the “prevention, diagnosis, and 
treatment of COVID-19.”172 
State laws also empower state governors to respond to 
public health emergencies with heightened authorities;173 under 
broadly drafted state laws, governors may exercise the power to 
“enforce all laws, rules, and regulations relating to emergency 
                                                          
 166. 50 U.S.C. § 1641 (2018). These reporting requirements include 
maintaining a file and index of all significant orders of the President, 
maintaining a file and index of all executive agencies’ emergency rules and 
regulations, transmitting to Congress all such orders, rules, and regulations, 
and transmitting to Congress relevant expenditure reports. Id. 
 167. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)(1). 
 168. FFCRA, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.) 
(2020). 
 169. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 9001–9141). 
 170. FFCRA, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 6001 - 6004, 134 Stat. 178, 201—207 
(2020) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b–5, 1395l, 1396d(a)(3)). 
 171. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136 § 3211, 134 Stat. 281, 368 (2020) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 254b(r)). 
 172. 42 U.S.C. § 254b(r)(6) (2020). 
 173. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8565–8574 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-
51(d)(4.1) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 30.405 (2020); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
418.011 (2020); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.015 (2020). 
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management and to assume direct operational control of all civil 
forces and helpers in the state . . . .”174 State law also enumerates 
specific, additional emergency powers granted to the governor, 
such as the power to mandate that healthcare facilities provide 
services to individuals in need.175 State departments of public 
health assist their respective governors in public health 
administration.176 State law generally charges state 
departments of public health with developing rules and 
regulations “appropriate for management of any public health 
emergency . . . .”177 As with the federal laws discussed above, 
state laws do not impose any specific requirement on governors 
to provide timely public access to TCQT, which, in the state 
context, would be challenging due to limited capacities. 
2. Legal Institutions  
The primary federal institutions charged with COVID-19 
response are the HHS and its ancillary agency, the CDC, both of 
which operate under the President’s administrative authority. 
The HHS develops policies on healthcare, and the CDC is a 
research-based agency that provides data and recommends 
guidelines to healthcare providers, state and local public health 
officials, private entities, and schools.178 The CDC is tasked with 
                                                          
 174. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-51(c)(1) (2020). Similarly, Michigan state law 
states that the governor “is responsible for coping with dangers to this state or 
the people of this state presented by a disaster or emergency.” MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 30.403 (2020). As another example, Texas state law charges the 
governor with meeting “the dangers to the state and people presented by 
disasters . . . .” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.011 (2020). 
 175. Georgia state law explicitly grants the governor the power to “[c]ompel 
a health care facility to provide services or the use of its facility if such services 
or use are reasonable and necessary for emergency response.” GA. CODE ANN. § 
38-3-51(d)(4.1) (2020). California, Texas, and West Virginia also statutorily 
authorize the state’s governor to commandeer private property or personnel if 
the governor determines such action is necessary for effective emergency 
response. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8572 (2020); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.017 
(2020); W. VA. CODE § 15-5-6(c)(3) (2020). 
 176. Peter D. Jacobson et al., Executive Decision Making for COVID-19: 
Public Health Science Through a Political Lens, in ASSESSING LEGAL 
RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 58. 
 177. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-2.1(b) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2453 
(2020); W. VA. CODE § 16-1-6(b) (2020). 
 178. Sarah H. Gordon et al., What Federalism Means for the US Response to 
Coronavirus Disease 2019, JAMA HEALTH FORUM (May 8, 2020), https://jaman
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“[m]onitoring and assessing viruses and illnesses[,]” “[b]uilding 
and supporting surveillance and response capacity[,]” 
“[i]mproving vaccines and other interventions[,]” and “[a]pplying 
research to provide science-based enhancement of prevention 
and control policies and programs.”179 Despite these mandates, 
federal institutions have shown limited effectiveness in 
containing the spread of COVID-19, delegating primary 
decision-making responsibilities to state and local officials.180 
At the state level, state departments of public health are the 
primary institutions in charge of COVID-19 management; they 
develop rules and regulations relating to public health 
emergency response and monitor and enforce its operations.181 
In the absence of federal leadership, state departments of public 
health and governors’ offices have assumed primary 
responsibility for developing policies as well as for adopting and 
enforcing relevant measures to combat COVID-19, such as 
public testing. The state departments coordinate with local 
health departments across their respective states and have 
authority to “monitor the administration, operation and 
coordination of the local boards of health and local health 
officer . . . .”182 State departments of health have an important 
role in promoting consistency among public health outcomes, 
with the legal authority to oversee and even preempt local public 
health administration. 183 
Without organized support from the federal government or 
nationwide coordination, state institutions, limited by resource 
constraints, have not been successful in containing COVID-19. 
As further discussed in Section III.A, the current institutional 
                                                          
etwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2766033 [https://perma.cc/FBD7-
Q7YW]. 
 179. What CDC Does, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://w
ww.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-commemoration/what-cdc-does.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9HZP-FM23] (last visited Dec. 9, 2020). 
 180. Peter D. Jacobson et al., Executive Decision Making for COVID-19: 
Public Health Science Through a Political Lens, in ASSESSING LEGAL 
RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 60. 
 181. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-2.1(b) (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2453 
(2020); W. VA. CODE § 16-1-6(b) (2020). 
 182. W. VA. CODE § 16-1-6(e) (2020). 
 183. Kim Haddow et al., Preemption, Public Health, and Equity in the Time 
of COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 
74. 
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framework is not effective in pandemic management, and there 
is a need for a new, reinforced institutional framework, such as 
a politically-independent national control center in the 
management of the pandemic, which will not be inhibited by 
partisan politics or resource constraints experienced by the 
current state institutions. 
B. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PUBLIC 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
Public access to information is another area in which legal 
and institutional frameworks affect pandemic management and 
requires a review in this context. The federal, state, and local 
governments are under broad legal mandates to collect and 
release information to the public,184 albeit subject to the 
limitations posed by the requirements of privacy and 
confidentiality.185 At the federal level, the PHSA requires the 
HHS Secretary to formulate a national strategy for promoting 
health information and to undertake the necessary actions to 
improve health knowledge in American society.186 The HHS 
Secretary is also empowered to conduct and support activities 
promoting public health information and promotion, including 
the publication of materials to be distributed to the public which 
instruct individuals on how to improve and safeguard their 
health.187 However, this provision does not contain an express 
                                                          
 184. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting a legal mandate to the federal 
government); U.S. CONST. amend. X (granting broad police power to state 
governments). State law governs the authorities of local government. See Bond 
v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 848 (2014) (“Because our constitutional 
structure leaves local criminal activity primarily to the States, we have 
generally declined to read federal law as intruding on that responsibility, unless 
Congress has clearly indicated that the law should have such reach.”). 
 185. 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2020); 45 C.F.R. pt. 46; 42 U.S.C. §§ 241(d), 
242m(d) (2018); 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); 45 C.F.R. pt. 5b. 
 186. 42 U.S.C. § 300u (2018). These activities include supporting the 
development of health education and providing technical assistance for health 
education. Id. The Secretary is also required to establish the Office of Disease 
Prevention and Health Promotion, which is responsible for coordinating health 
promotion activities in the government and the private sector and establishing 
a national information clearinghouse to facilitate the exchange and 
dissemination of health information. Id. 
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 300u-3 (2018). When carrying out these publication 
activities, the Secretary is required to make the published information 
accessible to populations of different social and economic backgrounds, and 
populations that speak other languages. See 42 U.S.C. § 300u-3(1). 
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standard for when the Secretary is obligated to carry out such 
publication activities; it simply provides that the Secretary is 
“authorized to conduct or support . . . such activities as may be 
required to make information . . . available to consumers of 
medical care, providers of such care, schools, and others who 
should be informed respecting such matters.”188 
Additional statutory devices, such as the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),189 control the collection and 
release of information at the federal level. Under the HIPAA, 
covered entities, such as hospitals, may disclose protected health 
information to public health authorities authorized by law to 
collect or receive such information to prevent or control 
disease190 and also to individuals who may have contracted or 
been exposed to a communicable disease.191 The HIPAA also 
authorizes covered entities to disclose protected health 
information that they believe is necessary to prevent or lessen a 
serious and imminent threat to a person or the public, when such 
disclosure is made to someone they believe can prevent or lessen 
the threat.192 The FOIA compels the government to release 
requested information unless it is protected under stipulated 
exceptions, but this release generally necessitates an affirmative 
request by a member of the public per the pre-set procedure.193 
At the state and local levels, every state has laws and 
regulations that mandate the reporting of the occurrence of 
diseases and conditions, prescribe the timing and nature of the 
information to be reported, 194 and stipulate the penalties for 
non-compliance.195 States have varied disease reporting 
systems: some states authorize the health commissioner or state 
boards to create, monitor, and revise the list of reportable 
                                                          
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 300u-3 (emphasis added). 
 189. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018); Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 201 
et seq. (2018). 
 190. 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i) (2021). 
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iv). 
 192. 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j)(1)(i)(A)–(B). 
 193. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)–(b). 
 194. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.1 (West 2020); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 31-12-2 (2020); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2101 (McKinney 2020). 
 195. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1280.4 (West 2020). 
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diseases and conditions under general statutory powers,196 and 
some other states require reports under both statutes and health 
department regulations.197 The mandatory reporting system 
enables state authorities to collect information from a range of 
professionals and organizations, including physicians, other 
healthcare providers, diagnostic laboratories, clinical facilities, 
and schools and daycare centers.198 However, the compliance 
rates with this reporting requirement, which may affect the 
quality of information, vary, ranging from 6 percent to 90 
percent for different common infectious conditions.199 This 
variance is attributed to the limitations in physicians’ 
knowledge of reporting requirements and procedures, as well as 
the assumption that laboratories have reported cases of 
infectious diseases.200 States may release the information 
subject to the limitations under their own privacy laws.201 States 
also have their own versions of FOIA to compel the state 
agencies to release requested information.202 As with the federal 
FOIA, its state versions also do not compel state governments to 
release information about the pandemic in the absence of a 
request by a member of the public.203 
As for the institutional framework, the CDC is the primary 
institution that collects, compiles, and releases information 
pertinent to COVID-19 to the public. It provides updates on the 
status of the pandemic, including the number of infection 
                                                          
 196. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-2a (2020). 
 197. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 2.1 (2020). 
 198. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-2; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2101–
2105 (McKinney 2020). 
 199. James D. Holt et al., The CDC Field Epidemiology Manual: Legal 
Considerations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc
.gov/eis/field-epi-manual/chapters/Legal.html#ref12 [https://perma.cc/A7ZL-TB
P5] (last updated Dec. 13, 2018). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-7-6 (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3701.17(B)(4) (2021); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 91-99 (McKinney 2020). 
 202. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6250–6270.7 (West 2020); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 50-18-70 et seq. (2021); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW §§ 84-90 (McKinney 2020). 
 203. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.17(C). 
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cases,204 deaths,205 and vaccinations206 daily, and publishes 
relevant guidelines and recommendations, such as personal 
hygiene recommendations.207 The CDC also oversees the 
National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), 
which collects data from public health departments and health 
care providers regarding specific diseases that have been 
deemed public health priorities.208 The NNDSS has been tasked 
with tracking data on COVID-19, and the CDC has been working 
with local public health departments to provide information 
regarding how to provide relevant data, as well as to provide 
technical assistance with reporting.209 The CDC also assists with 
contact tracing; while it does not administer a contact tracing 
program, it maintains a collection of resources to assist public 
health departments with building their own programs.210 
State health departments have broad legal mandates to 
supervise the work and activities of local health departments, 
supervise the reporting and control of the disease, and promote 
education in disease prevention.211 State laws authorize the 
state health departments to receive mandatory reports from a 
wide range of professionals, and this reporting system enables 
                                                          
 204. COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1 (charting COVID-19 cumulative 
cases). 
 205. Id. (charting COVID-19 cumulative deaths). 
 206. COVID-19 Vaccinations in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#vaccination
s [https://perma.cc/3BHW-PWTG] (last updated Dec. 28, 2020). 
 207. See, e.g., How to Protect Yourself and Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent
-getting-sick/prevention.html [https://perma.cc/2PVE-6LEF] (last updated 
Sept. 11, 2020). 
 208. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/ [https://perma
.cc/4G8U-EBTJ] (last updated Mar. 13, 2019). 
 209. NNDSS Supports the COVID-19 Response, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss/covid-19-response.html 
[https://perma.cc/FX35-DKTE] (last updated Aug. 10, 2020). 
 210. Contact Tracing Resources for Health Departments, supra note 128. 
These resources include a series of guidance documents for establishing and 
administering contact tracing in several different settings, such as schools and 
workplaces, documents that provide standards for evaluating the success of 
contact tracing programs, and digital tools for managing cases. Id. 
 211. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 201 (McKinney 2020). 
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the state authorities to secure and release health information.212 
State and local health departments maintain websites that 
provide the public with information pertinent to the pandemic, 
such as the number of tests completed, the location of testing 
sites, available financial assistance, industry guidelines, activity 
guidance, and access to exposure notification apps in some 
localities.213 However, information is scattered across numerous 
federal, state, and local health authority portals and websites, 
and there is no effective mechanism of coordination among the 
authorities to ensure the consistency of information to be 
released to the public across the nation. 
III.  CALL FOR A NEW APPROACH 
A. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
The preceding examination reveals that the current legal 
and institutional frameworks empower the federal and state 
governments to adopt measures to respond to health crises and 
collect information, but they do not compel the federal or state 
governments to ensure public access to TCQTs or release of 
information to the public. Under the current system, ensuring 
such public access and information release is largely left to the 
political discretion of the leadership with an underlying 
presumption that political leaders will use the legal mandate 
and institutional capacity to respond to the crisis. The conduct 
of the former Trump administration demonstrated that this 
presumption does not always hold. Moreover, political failures 
did not only exist at the federal level but also prevailed at state 
and local levels,214 showing that political failure at one level is 
not readily remedied by success at other levels. 
                                                          
 212. See, e.g., MINN. R. 4605.7050 (2017) (requiring reporting of certain 
illnesses and deaths). 
 213. See, e.g., Tracking COVID-19, CAL., https://covid19.ca.gov/ [https://pe
rma.cc/X6Q8-4MLX] (last updated Oct. 18, 2020); COVID-19 Citywide 
Information Portal, N.Y.C., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/coronavirus/index.page 
[https://perma.cc/KDM2-JPH6] (last updated Oct. 18, 2020). 
 214. See German Lopez, Everyone Failed on Covid-19: The US’s Coronavirus 
Epidemic Is an American Failure, Not Solely a Trump or Republican One, VOX 
(Jan. 2, 2021, 10:58 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/22176191/covid-1
9-coronavirus-pandemic-democrats-republicans-trump [https://perma.cc/UH4Y
-VCLS] (detailing the structural issues that impeded the public and states’ 
ability to act). 
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Thus, some describe the failure in COVID-19 management 
as a political failure, but the failure is also institutional in 
nature, i.e., current laws and institutions have failed to deliver 
an effective response to the pandemic. Laws and institutions 
that do not effectively operate in a political reality on the ground 
are a failure and require reform. Given the recent transition of 
power, one may well hope that the adverse political reality 
created by the unique behavior of the Trump administration is a 
one-off exception, never to be repeated, but in an increasingly 
unpredictable political environment today, there is no assurance 
against its recurrence. Considering the uncertainty, a better 
approach would be to ensure that the laws and institutions stand 
better chances for success in an adverse political environment, 
should there be a future pandemic. Laws and institutions are not 
immune from bad politics and may not guarantee success by 
themselves, but in a society where the rule of law prevails, they 
can be made more effective, through reform, to guide and even 
mandate a better response to a crisis. This section proposes such 
a reform. 
On the point of reform, several leading scholars and 
professionals, such as Gregg Gonsalves, Amy Kapczynski, and 
Albert Ko;215 Scott Burris, Sarah de Guia, Lance Gable, Donna 
Levin, and Wendy Parmet;216 Nicolas Terry;217 Amy Kapczynski 
                                                          
 215. See Letter from Gregg Gonsalves et. al., Assistant Prof., Yale Sch. Pub. 
Health to Mike Pence et. al., Vice-President of the United States (Mar. 2, 2020), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/final_covid-
19_letter_from_public_health_and_legal_experts.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2TM-
73JW] (calling on federal officials to implement the recommendations made and 
act urgently to protect the public from the threat of COVID-19). 
 216. See Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in 
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 1–5 (summarizing 
some of the Report’s many “specific legal recommendations for the president 
and Congress, governors and state legislatures, and mayors and city councilors 
across the country”). 
 217. See Nicolas Terry, COVID-19 and Healthcare Lessons Already Learned, 
7 J. L. & BIOSCI. 1, 1–12 (2020) (criticizing the United States’ “healthcare 
financing system that reflects individualism rather than solidarity” through the 
lens of COVID-19). 
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and Gregg Gonsalves;218 Stuti Khemani;219 and Lindsay Wiley, 
Elizabeth McCuskey, Matthew Lawrence, and Erin Fuse 
Brown,220 have analyzed various causes of the failure in the 
pandemic control and made proposals for improvement. These 
proposals include: implementing voluntary, rather than 
coercive, self-isolation;221 increasing the federal government’s 
support to healthcare safety net providers by better targeting 
federal emergency provider grants;222 recalibrating the country’s 
investments in clinical care versus public health (increasing the 
latter);223 launching federally-funded and locally-organized new 
jobs programs;224 better using communication to build 
legitimacy and trust in public institutions;225 and incrementally 
confronting the structural fixtures in law (individualism, fiscal 
fragmentation, federalism, and privatization) to construct 
health reform.226 
In comparison, this article’s proposed remedies, discussed in 
detail below, call for a more extensive legal and institutional 
reform than most of these suggestions. The extent of the 
proposed reform will nevertheless be justified considering the 
unprecedented number of infections and deaths from COVID-19 
                                                          
 218. See Amy Kapczynski & Gregg Gonsalves, The New Politics of Care, BOS. 
REV. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/politics/gregg-gonsalves-amy-kap
czynski-new-politics-care [https ://perma.cc/85EF-JWCD] (advocating for, 
among other solutions, a “Community Health Corps.” job program, contact 
tracing, and politics of “support and care, not separation and deprivation”). 
 219. See Stuti Khemani, An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in 




K] (focusing on strategies for the government to build public trust during the 
COVID-19 pandemic). 
 220. See Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 4 (“The thesis of 
this Article is that decades of reforms failed to prepare the United States for 
2020 because health reform has been conceptually and structurally constrained, 
so that to transcend these constraints requires nothing short of 
reconstruction.”). 
 221. Kapczynski & Gonsalves, supra note 212, at 4. 
 222. Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in 
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 4. 
 223. Terry, supra note 217, at 11. 
 224. Kapczynski & Gonsalves, supra note 218. 
 225. Khemani, supra note 219. 
 226. Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41. 
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and the inability of the current system to address these problems 
adequately. 
The problem is not lack of legal authority: current federal 
and state laws227 provide the federal and state administrations 
with ample authority to adopt necessary measures to combat 
COVID-19.228 As discussed above, the laws empower the 
government and grant discretion, but they do not obligate the 
government to adopt necessary measures in a timely fashion. As 
the President is not required to take any specific action in 
response to a pandemic and as it is left to his or her political 
discretion, the President may make a political decision not to 
engage fully with the pandemic, but rather to leave it to state 
officials who are under more immediate pressure to act, as 
former President Trump did in response to COVID-19.229 The 
lack of federal engagement has had serious ramifications; the 
scale of the current pandemic does not allow effective handling 
by individual states, as evidently shown by the failure of 
containing COVID-19 despite several state measures in place. 
The pandemic is not a crisis that can be handled solely by states, 
particularly in preventing transmissions and containing its 
spread across the nation, but a national and an international 
crisis that requires a full response by the federal government 
that has financial, technical, and administrative resources on a 
scale that is not available to state governments. 
This suggests that relevant laws, such as the Families First 
Coronavirus Response Act (limited to COVID-19) or the PHSA 
(generally), need to be amended to require the federal 
government to ensure public access to vaccination, testing, and 
treatment in a timely fashion (i.e. in pre-set timelines).230 As 
                                                          
 227. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300mm-61 (2018); 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
5121 et seq. (2018); National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (2018). 
 228. See also Lindsay K. Cloud et al., A Chronological Overview of the 
Federal, State, and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING LEGAL 
RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 10. 
 229. Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in 
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 3. 
 230. In addition, the federal government should be required to ensure the 
supply of medical equipment: by the time the federal administration began to 
take proactive measures, healthcare providers faced a large number of new 
patients and shortages of critical medical equipment, including personal 
protective equipment (PPE), ventilators and intensive care beds. Eric Lipton et 
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discussed above, uncertainty about the out-of-pocket cost 
deterred people from getting timely testing and treatment, 
particularly in the crucial early weeks of the pandemic.231 The 
FFCRA mandates that health insurers cover testing and 
vaccination without cost-sharing,232 but the coverage must be 
broader (i.e., covering both insured and uninsured individuals), 
immediate, and unambiguous in its terms, so that the cost 
concern will not impede getting tests in time. This is the first 
crucial step to contain the pandemic. As to the cost of treatment, 
the FFCRA is silent, and patients may incur a cost under the 
terms of their health insurance, and those without insurance 
coverage or with insufficient coverage will be discouraged from 
seeking medical treatment, which, in turn, will exacerbate the 
spread of the disease. 
The substantial risk requires the expansion of federal 
coverage to include the cost of treatment. The proposed 
amendment must clarify that the costs of COVID-19 related 
doctor visits, treatment, and medicine will not be billed directly 
to any patient so that patients are not deterred from seeking 
treatment until the last minute. This does not mean that the 
amendment should require the federal government to take up 
the entire cost; rather, it requires that the federal government 
cover the gaps between the cost and the coverage by insurance 
or by any other existing funding so that there is no ambiguity in 
coverage or cost concern to the public in seeking treatment.233 
The rationale for the suggested federal coverage is to encourage 
                                                          
al., He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure 
on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/u
s/politics/coronavirus-trump-response.html?action=click&module=RelatedLink
s&pgtype=Article [https://perma.cc/HVY3-XPSK]. 
 231. See Witters, supra note 61 and accompanying text (reporting that cost 
concerns deterred early testing). 
 232. FFCRA §§ 6001–6004, 42 U.S.C. USC §§ 1320b-5, 1395l, 1396d(a)(3) 
(2020); CARES Act, §§ 3201, 3203(a), 41 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2020). 
 233. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) runs the 
COVID-19 Uninsured Program for qualified COVID-19 related services, 
including tests, vaccines, and treatment, but it is the responsibility of the 
uninsured patient to confirm whether the healthcare provider participates in 
this program, and one may still be responsible for full payment of the bill if the 
provider did not submit a bill for COVID-19-related testing, and/or treatment 
to the HRSA. COVID-19 Care for Uninsured Individuals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/covid-19-care-uninsured-indi
viduals/index.html [https://perma.cc/8ZFF-P7Q4] (last updated Sept. 15, 2021). 
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the public to test and treat promptly, thereby containing the 
pandemic and minimizing its adverse socio-economic impact. 
The amendment must also enable the government to limit the 
maximum amount that providers can charge for the tests and 
control the amount the manufacturers charge for COVID-19 
medicines and vaccines to eliminate price gouging, price 
discrimination, and waste.234 COVID-19 treatment must also be 
combined with effective quarantine requirements. 
The proposed legal reform should also require the 
government to ensure timely contact tracing and isolation of 
those infected with COVID-19, including asymptomatic and 
mildly symptomatic COVID-19 patients, and their treatment 
(i.e., treatment in public facilities isolated from outside physical 
contact, such as CTCs). The amendment should also mandate 
that individuals who have not tested positive but have been 
exposed to the virus, and who have been identified, through 
contact tracing, to be at risk of infection, should also be placed 
in self-quarantine under monitoring by health authorities.235 
Effective contact tracing, quarantine, and isolation would not be 
possible without close cooperation and coordination with state 
                                                          
 234. See Health Reform Reconstruction, supra note 41, at 40. As for COVID-
19 medicines—such as Veklury (Remdesivir) and Regenerion’s anti-body 
cocktail (Casirivimab and Imdevimab)—another proposal calls for an 
amendment of the FFCRA to stipulate the responsibility of the federal 
government to ensure that i) sufficient amounts of the COVID-19 medicines are 
produced and made available to patients, by taking necessary measures, 
including granting third-party manufacturers license (i.e., “march-in” rights 
under Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. § 203), to increase production and lower 
prices; and ii) COVID-19 patients have immediate access to these medicines 
without bearing the burden of cost-share obligations, by requiring the federal 
government to have a cost-sharing agreement with suppliers, hospitals, and 
insurers (but no cost-sharing obligations to the public). Lee & Mun, supra note 
126, at 535. The federal government will be required to cover the cost of these 
medicines to the extent that is not covered by insurers or the other existing 
funds. Id. A commentator also points out that there has been a lack of public 
guidance on the ethical distribution of scarce therapeutics, ventilators, ICU 
beds, and critical care staff among hospitals and states; when there was a 
shortage, those with financial resources and existing connections to the 
suppliers acquired them, rather than states, communities, or hospitals with 
strongest needs. See Megan Ranney, Valerie Griffith & Ashish Jha, Critical 
Supply Shortages — The Need for Ventilators and Personal Protective 
Equipment During the Covid-19 Pandemic, 382 N. ENG. J. MED. e41 (2020) 
(explaining the causes of the shortages and possible solutions to cure them). 
 235. In such cases, the cost of mandatory self-quarantine is to be reimbursed 
by the government up to a pre-defined limit. 
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and local authorities, and the law must prescribe a process by 
which such cooperation and coordination among the federal, 
state, and local authorities will be implemented. 
Insufficient vaccination is another concern. Sufficient 
amounts of vaccines have been made available for the public 
since the spring of 2021, but as of October 2021, over 40 percent 
of the population has not been fully vaccinated.236 There has 
been continuing political mistrust among a large segment of the 
public about the need for the control of the disease and the 
necessity of vaccination despite the on-going pandemic 
accompanying large numbers of new infections and deaths on a 
daily basis.237 Consideration should be given to possible legal 
and institutional approaches that would encourage vaccination, 
including linking vaccination to Coronavirus Tax Relief and 
Economic Impact Payments that have been offered by the Biden 
administration.238 Relevant legislation, such as the American 
Rescue Plan Act of 2021,239 could be amended to authorize the 
government to provide greater amounts of tax relief and 
payments, as an incentive, for those who have been vaccinated. 
Finally, the amendment should require the government to 
promptly release all information necessary to prevent further 
spread of the pandemic to the public, including some of the 
information obtained through contact tracing, such as the time 
and location of recent visits made by those infected with the 
disease so that the public may take appropriate precaution. 
Federal and state laws regulate how health information may be 
collected and released,240 but they generally do not impose an 
affirmative requirement on the government to release specific 
information to the public (without a request under the FOIA or 
its state versions); the laws do not mandate the timing of the 
release, which would be critical for the public to make timely 
                                                          
 236. U.S. COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker, supra note 33. 
 237. COVID Data Tracker, supra note 1. 
 238. See Coronavirus Tax Relief, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/coronavirus-tax-
relief-and-economic-impact-payments [https://perma.cc/GN6R-CNJV] (last 
updated Aug. 6, 2021); Economic Impact Payments, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/co
ronavirus/economic-impact-payments [https://perma.cc/QGS7-H4C8] (last 
updated Aug. 6, 2021). 
 239. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (March 
11, 2021). 
 240. See discussion supra Sections I.C. and II.B (discussing public access to 
information and legal and institutional framework for public access to 
information). 
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preparations for the pandemic, or the extent of the information 
that these authorities must provide to the public, leaving them 
at the discretion of the authorities. 
Some may not consider such a legal mandate to be 
necessary, as significant public concern associated with the 
pandemic is expected to pressure the government to provide 
pertinent information to the public. However, the authorities 
may also have an incentive to conceal or slow down the release 
of information for political reasons, as suspected by the public 
when the Trump administration required hospitals to bypass the 
CDC and report directly to a centralized database in 
Washington, D.C.,241 in which case such a delay or concealment 
would be adverse to the public interest in the pandemic 
situation. Thus, there is a need for a legal adjustment that will 
not only authorize but also require the government to disclose 
relevant information to the public promptly, as successfully 
implemented elsewhere.242 
The second part of this proposal is an institutional reform to 
establish a bi-partisan institutional control center, such as a 
national commission headed by a politically independent agency 
(like the politically independent CDC) in charge of controlling 
                                                          
 241. See COVID-19 Guidance for Hospital Reporting and FAQs for 
Hospitals, Hospital Laboratory, and Acute Care Facility Data Reporting, U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/defau
lt/files/covid-19-faqs-hospitals-hospital-laboratory-acute-care-facility-data-re
porting.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3LU-7WYW] (explaining how hospitals were 
required to report COVID-19 data); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trump 
Administration Strips C.D.C. of Control of Coronavirus Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14/us/politics/trump-cdc-coronavirus
.html [https://perma.cc/Y75S-F542] (updated Sept. 9, 2020). Under public 
pressure, the Trump administration subsequently reversed this decision, 
allowing the CDC to collect and report COVID-19 data. Robbie Whelan, Covid-
19 Data Will Once Again Be Collected by CDC, in Policy Reversal, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/troubled-covid-19-data-system-re
turning-to-cdc-11597945770 [https://perma.cc/WG3X-ZHRN]. 
 242. In South Korea, for example, the government is under such legal 
requirements. Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, Act No. 17067, 
Mar. 4, 2020, art. 6, ¶ 2 (S. Kor.) (emphasis added), translated in Korea 
Legislation Research Institute online database, https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_serv
ice/lawView.do?hseq=53530&lang=ENG. The relevant Korean law, the 
Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act stipulates in relevant part that 
“each citizen shall have the right to know information on the situation of the 
outbreak of infectious diseases and the prevention and control of infectious 
diseases and how to cope therewith, and the State and local governments shall 
promptly disclose the relevant information.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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infectious diseases (hereinafter “the Commission”). There is also 
no effective coordination mechanism among federal, state, and 
local authorities governing pandemic response. Considering the 
significant disarray, there is a call for an autonomous 
government organization whose decisions are not to be 
determined by political considerations.243 There is indeed a need 
for an institutional command center to expedite the 
implementation of TCQT. Such a command center must be 
authorized to collect and disseminate all necessary information 
to combat the pandemic, develop and implement effective 
guidelines, and coordinate with the other relevant federal 
departments and agencies, as well as state and local authorities 
for the implementation of TCQT. Successful implementation is 
contingent upon acquiring personal protective equipment (PPE) 
and other medical equipment in time, and the command center 
should also have the authority to secure the crucial equipment 
for TCQT for clinics and hospitals in cooperation with state and 
local authorities as well as the private sector. 
The Commission would be comprised of representatives 
from federal, state, and select local governments,244 as well as 
representatives of the private sector (e.g., medical equipment 
suppliers, pharmaceutical companies, healthcare providers, and 
experts in public health). The proposed Commission would be 
charged with coordinating among federal, state, and local 
authorities and between the public and private sectors, in the 
development and implementation of policies and specific 
measures to combat the pandemic. 
As mentioned above, securing a degree of political 
independence will be important for the Commission to develop 
policies and implement timely measures in the best interest of 
public health, but there is a question whether other pertinent 
considerations, such as economic considerations, should be 
completely disregarded from the Commission’s decision-making 
process. For example, the stay-at-home orders in April may have 
stabilized the number of infection cases, but they also caused an 
                                                          
 243. See Scott Burris et al., Summary of Findings and Recommendations, in 
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, supra note 3, at 7; see also 
Federalism in Pandemic Prevention and Response, supra note 43, at 69. 
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unprecedented number of job losses.245 This concern will 
necessitate the inclusion of representatives from the federal 
government in the Commission, as well as representatives from 
state and local governments. Experts in the head agency could 
develop specific policies and guidelines, to be adopted by the 
proposed Commission after consultations and deliberation 
among the representatives. The adoption of the policies and 
guidelines would, ideally, be made by consensus of the 
representatives, to secure maximum cooperation for 
implementation from federal, state, and local governments, or by 
a majority vote where such consensus cannot be reached. The 
adopted policies and measures should, in principle, be 
implemented through state and local enforcement mechanisms, 
rather than through federal preemption. 
There could also be a question whether representatives of 
the private sector, such as suppliers of medical equipment, 
pharmaceutical companies, and healthcare providers, should be 
invited to participate in the Commission. The proposed legal 
reform will not meet its regulatory objective of securing timely 
public access to TCQT without cooperation from the private 
sector. Cooperation with the private sector is, thus, essential, 
and it would also be important to consider their views in 
formulating policies and implementing measures, but there is a 
concern that the private sector interests, which may not always 
be aligned with the best interest of public health, might 
influence (or even dominate) the decision-making process 
through collusion, should they be allowed to participate in the 
Commission. Considering this adverse possibility, the role of the 
private sector representatives should be limited to an advisory 
one. The Commission and the government may also assist the 
private sector to maintain a proper level of production and 
healthcare capacities during the pandemic to secure timely 
public access to TCQT. 
The proposed Commission should also oversee contact 
tracing and isolated treatment in systematic coordination with 
state and local authorities. As discussed above, it will be 
important to revise federal guidelines on contact tracing so that 
there will be uniform criteria for the collection and 
dissemination of sensitive private information and that the 
                                                          
 245. See Payroll Employment Down 20.5 Million in April 2020, supra note 
29 and accompanying text (reporting 20.5 million job losses in April 2020 alone). 
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intrusion upon individual privacy will be minimized while 
securing the information necessary for contact tracing. The 
status of contact tracing should be reported to the Commission’s 
head agency, and the Commission should also provide necessary 
support to state and local authorities, which require assistance 
with their own contact tracing. As for the isolated treatment in 
quarantine, the Commission’s task will be to ensure 
procurement of sites for treatment facilities, as well as medical 
personnel for those facilities,246 again, in close and systematic 
coordination with state and local governments, as well as 
hospitals, clinics, and medical schools in the region. The 
Commission should also develop guidelines on the monitoring 
process for those who are ordered to self-quarantine (i.e., those 
suspected of infection but not tested positive), and coordinate 
with state and local authorities to ensure effective monitoring. 
Finally, the proposed Commission, through its head agency, 
should also seek to create and maintain international networks 
of support and cooperation with the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and also with public health agencies in other countries 
affected by COVID-19, particularly those countries that have 
successfully contained the spread of the pandemic in its early 
stages.247 The significant differences in many relevant factors, 
such as governance system, institutional frameworks, public 
compliance, technological environment, and healthcare system, 
set certain limits on the “good policies” adoptable from successful 
countries. Considering the failure in the United States, however, 
serious efforts must be made to learn the successful practices of 
other countries and explore ways to adopt them, perhaps after 
making due adjustments.248 
B. RELEVANCE OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
This article adopts a novel approach to assess the impact of 
the proposed legal and institutional reform concerning COVID-
19 management and to identify possible issues in its 
implementation. The adopted approach is originated in law and 
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converted to CTCs. See Choi et al., supra note 19. 
 247. See Berger, supra note 14. 
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development studies. “‘Law and development’ is an area of 
inquiry on the interrelationship between law and 
development”249 where “development” is understood as “a 
progressive transformation of the economy and society.”250 Law 
and development has been concerned primarily with “developing 
countries,” exploring the role of law for economic and social 
development in these countries; however, the changing economic 
and social realities for developed countries, such as regional 
economic disparity within developed countries, increasing 
income gaps among their citizens, and deepening racial divides, 
render a law and development approach relevant to address 
economic and social problems in developed countries, the 
resolution of which may require a “progressive transformation” 
of the underlying economic and social structure through legal 
and institutional reform.251 
Thus, a law and development approach is also relevant to 
assess the legal and institutional reform necessitated by the 
failure of COVID-19 management, because the proposed reform 
seeks to transform or overcome the underlying economic, social, 
and political processes that adversely affect public access to 
TCQT during a pandemic. The COVID-19 crisis may not be a 
traditional “development” issue, but it is analogous in the sense 
that its resolution requires a progressive transformation of the 
relevant economic, social, and political conditions that adversely 
affect timely public access to TCQT. In the pandemic context, the 
relevant economic condition would be the cost issue impacting 
public access to testing and treatment, the social condition would 
be the prevailing preference for individualism and privacy over 
collective response to the pandemic, and the political 
consideration would be the pervasive partisan politics and 
fragmented authorities in the absence of effective federal 
leadership for the first year of the pandemic period. 
The assessment of the proposed legal and institutional 
reform requires the identification of a suitable analytical device. 
Leading scholars in law and development, such as Trubek and 
                                                          
 249. THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 46, at 3. 
 250. Id. at 11. 
 251. See id. at 111; see also Yong-Shik Lee, Law and Economic Development 
in the United States: Toward a New Paradigm, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 229 (2019); 
Yong-Shik Lee, Law and Development in the United States: A Nexus with the 
Civil Rights, 44 S. ILL. U. L. J. 433 (2020). 
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Galanter (1974),252 Merryman (1977),253 Snyder (1982),254 North 
(1991),255 Tamanaha (1995),256 Chibundu (1997),257 Posner 
(1998),258 Chua (1998),259 Cross (2002),260 Davis and Trebilcock 
(2001),261 Barr and Avi-Yonah (2004),262 McInerney (2005),263 
                                                          
 252. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: 
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REV. 723 (1980). 
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Carty ed., 1992) and LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD, (Sammy Adelman 
& Abdul Paliwala, eds. 1993)). 
 257. See Maxwell O. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding 
and Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 167 (1997) (focusing on 
Sub-Saharan Africa to show the relevance of law in the development of Third 
World countries). 
 258. See Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic 
Development, 13 WORLD BANK OBSERVER 1 (1998) (proposing a framework of 
legal reform for economic growth in countries). 
 259. See Amy Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward A New 
Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L. J. 1 (1998) (arguing that 
marketization and democratization may drive ethnic tensions). 
 260. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737 
(2002) (surveying the field of research on economic growth and the law). 
 261. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms and 
Development, 22 THIRD WORLD Q. 21 (2001) (examining the role of legal 
intuitions in the pursuit of development). 
 262. See Michael S. Barr & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Law and 
Development: Introduction and Overview (Globalization, Law and Development 
Conference), 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2004) (providing an overview of the key 
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 263. See Thomas F. McInerney, Law and Development as Democratic 
Practice, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 109 (2005) (examining law and 
development through a political-theoretical lens). 
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Chodosh (2006),264 Dam (2006),265 Chukwumerije (2009),266 and 
Prado (2009),267 have addressed a range of issues about law and 
development. These scholars have called for new approaches, 
including theoretical underpinnings that explain the dynamics 
among law, institutions, and the existing political, social, and 
economic conditions.268 
The recently-developed General Theory responds to this call 
and provides an analytical framework to assess the impact of 
law, legal frameworks, and institutions (LFIs) on economic and 
social development.269 The General Theory is comprised of two 
parts: the first part of the theory sets the disciplinary 
parameters of law and development, and the second part 
explains the causal relationship between law and development 
through “the regulatory impact mechanisms,” which refers to 
the mechanisms by which law impacts development, with 
references made to institutional frameworks and socioeconomic 
conditions.270 The second part of the General Theory, namely the 
regulatory impact mechanisms, addresses the impact of the 
proposed legal and institutional reform.271 The remainder of this 
section introduces the relevant part of the theory (the regulatory 
impact mechanisms).272 Part IV applies the General Theory to 
the proposed legal and institutional reform and examines its 
impact and expected implementation issues.273 
The regulatory impact mechanisms are comprised of three 
analytical elements: “regulatory design,” “regulatory 
                                                          
 264. See HIRAM E. CHODOSH, GLOBAL JUSTICE REFORM: A COMPARATIVE 
METHODOLOGY (2005) (outlining the risks and benefits of the comparative 
methodology in global justice reform). 
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compliance,” and “quality of implementation,” with additional 
sub-elements under each of these three elements.274 These 
elements are conceptually distinct but interrelated and 
influence one another.275 The first element of the regulatory 
impact mechanisms, regulatory design, analyzes how law is 
designed to achieve a development objective.276 Regulatory 
design is analyzed by three sub-elements: anticipated policy 
outcome; organization of law, legal frameworks, and institutions 
(LFIs); and law’s adaptation to socioeconomic conditions.277 The 
first sub-element, anticipated policy outcome, refers to the 
outcome of the policy that law is anticipated to deliver.278 For 
example, an increase in the number of diagnostic tests 
performed would be the anticipated policy outcome of a law that 
mandates covering the cost of testing. Examination of the 
anticipated policy outcome is aided by methods and analytics of 
relevant social sciences, which include, but are not limited to, 
economics, political science, anthropology, and sociology.279 
The second sub-element, organization of LFIs, examines the 
dynamics and interrelations among law, applicable legal 
frameworks, and relevant institutions.280 Regulatory design is 
enhanced by positive synergies among the constituent elements 
of LFIs.281 For example, a law that aims to ensure social 
distancing and mask-wearing in public places may not be 
effective without operative institutional frameworks, such as an 
enforcement mechanism against violations. The third sub-
element, adaptation to socioeconomic conditions, examines 
whether law conforms to relevant social, political, economic, and 
cultural conditions (“socioeconomic conditions”).282 For instance, 
a law that aims to provide timely public access to information 
related to COVID-19 will have only limited impact on improving 
information accessibility if the underlying socioeconomic 
conditions are incompatible; e.g., where a majority of the 
population culturally disfavor releasing their private 
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 281. Id. at 442. 
 282. Id. at 444. 
2021] MANAGING COVID-19 57 
 
information (such as the time and location of their visits after 
contracting the virus) even during a pandemic. Thus, adaptation 
to the prevailing socioeconomic conditions is essential to the 
successful operation of law, and in this example, a law will have 
to mandate extensive public engagement and education 
campaigns to solicit cooperation from the public. 
In addition to the regulatory design which is assessed by the 
anticipated policy outcome, an organization of LFIs, and the 
law’s adaptation to socioeconomic conditions, the General 
Theory presents two other elements to determine the impact of 
law: regulatory compliance and quality of implementation.283 
The second element, regulatory compliance, examines 
compliance with law by the public.284 Law would not have impact 
without due compliance by the public, who are subject to the 
application of law.285 Regulatory compliance is analyzed under 
two sub-elements: general regulatory compliance and specific 
regulatory compliance.286 General regulatory compliance 
examines the overall level of compliance with law in a given 
jurisdiction.287 Social and political factors, such as legal culture 
in society and public confidence in the state implementing law, 
influence general regulatory compliance.288 Specific regulatory 
compliance pertains to the strength of compliance with a 
particular law.289 A key element determining specific regulatory 
compliance is the consistency between a particular law and the 
socioeconomic conditions on the ground;290 i.e., even in a society 
where general regulatory compliance is strong, a particular law 
may still have weak compliance when it does not conform to the 
socioeconomic conditions prevailing on the ground.291 A law that 
mandates quarantine of those infected with COVID-19 in a CTC-
type facility may not attract strong regulatory compliance 
without incentives, where a culture that emphasizes individual 
autonomy and freedom prevails. 
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The third and final element under the regulatory impact 
mechanisms is quality of implementation.292 This element 
assesses the degree to which a state meets the requirements of 
law and undertakes its mandates to fulfill regulatory 
objectives.293 Laws which are otherwise well-designed and 
command strong compliance by the public will not have much 
impact if the state fails to properly implement them.294 In the 
preceding example, a law that attempts to ensure social 
distancing and mask-wearing in public places would not be 
successful unless the state implements them effectively by 
enforcing these laws with sufficient capacity (e.g., competent 
personnel, technical resources, adequate budget). State capacity, 
including its financial, technological, and administrative 
capabilities for the implementation of law, is a key determinant 
of the quality of implementation.295 The implementation of law 
also requires a degree of political will, particularly when 
implementation poses political challenges for reasons including 
conflicts of interest and preferences within a society and among 
different segments of the population.296 Political will would be 
necessary to enforce mask-wearing mandates where a 
significant portion of the population feels uncomfortable wearing 
masks, rendering such a mandate politically unpopular. These 
two factors, state capacity and political will, are essential 
elements that determine the quality of implementation.297 
IV. APPLYING THE GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
A. REGULATORY DESIGN 
Under the General Theory, the impact of the proposed 
reform is assessed against its analytical elements, beginning 
with the first—regulatory design—and the three sub-elements, 
                                                          
 292. Id. at 450. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 451–52. 
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 297. See Yong-Shik Lee, General Theory of Law and Development: An 
Overview, 12 L. & DEV. REV. 351, 368–71 (2019) (analyzing the ways in which 
state capacity and political will impact the ability of the state to implement a 
given law). 
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anticipated policy outcome, organization of LFIs, and adaptation 
to socioeconomic conditions.298 
1. Anticipated Policy Outcome 
The proposed legal requirement to ensure timely public 
access to TCQT is expected to expedite the government’s 
preparations if the law identifies each of the governmental steps 
to be taken and sets timelines for each of these steps. The 
proposed reform reduces political discretion embedded in the 
current law by imposing a mandatory requirement on the 
government to take preparatory steps in pre-set timelines.299 
Currently, there is no recourse under the law when the 
government does not exercise its legal authority to mobilize 
resources and make preparations, as shown by the conduct of the 
previous Trump administration which neglected to proceed 
expeditiously with preparations during the early stages of the 
pandemic, leaving the primary responsibility of controlling the 
pandemic to the state and local authorities. This must be 
remedied by adding a legal requirement for the government to 
take specific steps to ensure timely public access to TCQT.300 The 
proposed amendment to link vaccination to individual tax relief 
and payments may also increase the rate of vaccination, 
although it is unclear how effective such economic incentive will 
be for those who object to vaccination for political reasons or 
concerns about possible side-effects after vaccination.301 
As for the proposed institutional reform, the anticipated 
policy outcome of setting a national, bi-partisan Commission 
headed by a politically independent agency will be the 
separation of the pandemic response from political 
considerations that may delay timely public warnings and 
preparations. This anticipated policy outcome will be enhanced 
by ensuring the political autonomy of the proposed Commission 
as a fully independent regulatory agency, such as the Securities 
                                                          
 298. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 436. 
 299. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 300. A statutory right should be granted to members of the public so that an 
individual may have standing to challenge a violation. 
 301. The CDC reports that possible side effects are likely mild. Possible Side 
Effects After Getting a COVID-19 Vaccine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Sep. 30, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccin
es/expect/after.html [https://perma.cc/KME3-ZRJR]. 
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and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve. This 
separation will also have the effect of enhancing coordination 
among federal, state, and local authorities, minimizing partisan 
political interests and interferences in the development and 
implementation of measures to combat the pandemic. 
2. Organization of LFIs 
The second sub-element under the regulatory design is 
organization of LFIs.302 A question may be raised whether 
requiring the federal government to ensure public access to 
TCQT would be compatible with the federal legal system in the 
United States, whose Constitution limits the role of the federal 
government.303 Some may argue that the job should be left with 
state and local authorities, as well as the private sector. Another 
potential question is whether the no cost-share requirement for 
TCQT will be compatible with the current private healthcare 
system, where a majority of the public rely on private healthcare 
provisions whereby the financial arrangement for the cost is to 
be determined by private insurance contracts. As for the first 
question, the lesson from the current pandemic is that 
irrespective of the federal system, leaving the primary 
responsibility to combat COVID-19 to state and local 
governments, whose resources may not be sufficient to deal with 
a pandemic on a national or an international scale, or to the 
private sector, whose interests may not necessarily be aligned 
with public health interests, does not ensure successful control 
of the disease. The federal government, armed with superior 
resources and information, must be required to take the lead and 
adopt the necessary steps to respond to the pandemic in pre-
defined timelines. This proposed legal adjustment is necessary 
to ensure the federal response. The proposal is not to supersede 
or preempt state and local authorities; rather, it is to create a 
strong coordination mechanism, in conjunction with the 
proposed Commission, so that the policies and measures that are 
developed to control the pandemic are implemented through 
                                                          
 302. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 419 (“[R]egulatory design is analyzed in 
the following three categories (sub-elements): anticipated policy outcome; 
organization of law, legal frameworks, and institutions (‘LFI’); and adaptation 
to socioeconomic conditions . . . .”). 
 303. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor [the powers] prohibited by [the Constitution] to the 
states, are reserved to the states . . . .”). 
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state and local enforcement mechanisms in systematic 
cooperation among federal, state, and local authorities. The 
proposed Commission, as an institutional control center, should 
serve this function. 
As for the second question—the federal government’s 
guarantee for vaccination, testing, and treatment costs—the 
current federal COVID-19 legislation already requires 
healthcare insurance providers not to impose cost-sharing on the 
insured for tests, vaccines, and preventive care.304 The proposed 
reform adds a requirement for the government to make an 
explicit guarantee to the public that they will bear no out-of-
pocket cost for COVID-19 related treatment regardless of their 
insurance status; the objective is to ensure that the public will 
not be discouraged from seeking treatment because of cost 
concern and that this concern will not become a cause for further 
spread of the disease.305 The explicit government guarantee will 
be required to contain the spread of the disease by timely testing 
and treatment, and any personal benefit to COVID-19 patients 
is incidental and subordinate to the national interest to contain 
the pandemic. Thus, the proposed legal adjustment will be 
consistent with the powers granted to the federal government in 
the context of a national emergency.306 
                                                          
 304. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 6001–
6004, 134 Stat. 178, 201–08 (waiving cost-sharing on COVID-19 testing and 
certain clinical visits related to testing); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b–5, 1395l, 
1396d(a)(3)(B) (2020) (establishing authorization to waive requirements during 
national emergencies); Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 
Pub. L. No. 116-136, §§ 3201, 3203(a), 134 Stat. 184, 366–67 (ordering insurance 
providers to cover COVID-19 testing, preventive services, and vaccines); 41 
U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2020) (covering preventive services). 
 305. Witters, supra note 61 (presenting evidence that one in every seven 
Americans (14%) is deterred from seeking healthcare for themselves or a family 
member when experiencing COVID-19 symptoms due to high healthcare costs). 
 306. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300mm-61 (2018) 
(authorizing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to lead medical 
response to public health emergencies); Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2018) (authorizing delivery 
of federal assistance to states and localities during emergencies); National 
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (2018) (establishing ground rules for 
how the federal government responds to national emergencies). 
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3. Adaptation to Socioeconomic Conditions 
As to the adaptation to socioeconomic conditions, the third 
sub-element for the regulatory design, a relevant question is 
whether the proposed reform can be supported by financial, 
technical, and cultural conditions on the ground.307 The legal 
reform, which will require the government to ensure timely 
public access to TCQT, necessitates securing sufficient 
quantities of test kits, masks, PPE, medicine, contact tracers, 
and medical facilities. The relevant industries reportedly have 
sufficient production capacities for medical supplies,308 but 
securing a needed number of contact tracers to perform contact 
tracing as well as treatment centers to isolate asymptomatic and 
mildly symptomatic patients could prove to be a challenge. The 
role of the federal government is to ensure, in close coordination 
with state and local authorities, as well as with the private 
sector counterparts, that sufficient quantities of medical 
supplies are produced, secured, and distributed in time; enough 
contact tracers are recruited throughout the country; and the 
sites for treatment centers are secured. Monitoring will be 
another issue, with the monitored quarantine of those who have 
not tested positive but have been exposed to the risk of infection. 
It might be a challenge to acquire the capacity for proper 
monitoring. 
As for the proposed Commission, strong bi-partisan support 
will be necessary at the federal, state, and local levels to ensure 
the successful operation of the Commission. A question may be 
raised whether the current partisan and divisive political 
environment is conducive to the successful operation of such a 
bi-partisan Commission where representatives from federal, 
state, and local authorities must cooperate and coordinate in the 
development and implementation of policies and measures. 
There is a risk that the partisan political interests among the 
representatives may impede the work of the Commission, and it 
remains to be seen whether the unprecedented magnitude of the 
                                                          
 307. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 444 (defining socioeconomic conditions 
as a range of social, political, economic, and cultural conditions). 
 308. See, e.g., Tracker: How Businesses Are Accelerating Production of 
Critical Medical Supplies to Combat the Coronavirus, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., 
https://www.uschamber.com/article/tracker-how-businesses-are-accelerating-p
roduction-of-critical-medical-supplies-combat-the [https://perma.cc/KR7W-JXN
Q] (last updated May 12, 2020) (listing efforts of forty-four American businesses 
to provide aid for the coronavirus response). 
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current pandemic will generate popular support or pressure for 
a bi-partisan effort to form a united front against the pandemic. 
The leadership role of the politically independent head agency, 
as well as support from political leaders, expert groups, and the 
general population, will be crucial for the success of the 
Commission. 
B. REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
The second analytical element in the regulatory impact 
mechanisms, regulatory compliance, is also relevant to assess 
the proposed reform. As discussed above, regulatory compliance 
is analyzed by two sub-elements: general regulatory compliance 
and specific regulatory compliance.309 
1. General Regulatory Compliance 
The level of regulatory compliance, which refers to the 
general level of regulatory compliance in a given jurisdiction, can 
be measured by proxy indicators such as the rule of law indexes 
compiled by the World Justice Project and the World Bank, as 
the rule of law would not be feasible without regulatory 
compliance.310 The ratings of the United States are high on these 
indexes: twenty-first among 128 countries under the Rule of Law 
Index 2020 by World Justice Report and 89.9 percentile under 
the Rule of Law Indicator 2020 by the World Bank,311 indicating 
a high level of general regulatory compliance. This outcome is 
consistent with a prevailing observation that the United States 
has one of the world’s most advanced legislative, judicial, and 
law enforcement systems, the combination of which is bound to 
                                                          
 309. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 446 (“Regulatory compliance can be 
classified into general regulatory compliance, which refers to the general level 
of regulatory compliance in a given jurisdiction, and specific regulatory 
compliance, which pertains to a particular law.”). 
 310. Rule of Law Index 2020, WORLD JUST. PROJECT (2020), https://worldju
sticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020-Online_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XU6Z-AE6S] (“[M]easuring the rule of law based on the 
experiences and perceptions of the general public and in-country legal 
practitioners and experts worldwide.”); Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
WORLD BANK (2020), https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ [https://perma
.cc/L682-PZK2] (reporting “aggregate and individual governance indicators for 
over 200 countries and territories . . . for six dimensions of government.”). 
 311. WORLD JUST. PROJECT, supra note 310, at 154; WORLD BANK, supra 
note 310. 
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command generally a high level of regulatory compliance by the 
public. The long tradition of the rule of law, which began with 
the birth of the nation, is also conducive to general regulatory 
compliance. 
2. Specific Regulatory Compliance 
Against this backdrop, specific regulatory compliance can be 
assessed. Regulatory compliance does not mean only the absence 
of rule violations, but also the knowledge of law and 
participation in the processes mandated by law.312 There have 
been substantial compliance and implementation issues in 
pandemic management. 
In the crucial weeks of February through early March of 
2020, the Trump administration failed to inform the public 
about the danger of the disease and to present effective 
guidelines for mitigating its spread.313 The administration had 
banned entry from China in January of 2020 to prevent further 
spread of the disease from the place that was believed to be its 
origin,314 but the Trump administration neither cautioned the 
public about the risk of the spread of the disease within the 
United States nor made due preparations, such as securing a 
sufficient number of test kits and face masks to be made 
available to the public.315 The lack of follow-up actions led the 
public to believe—at least until the first half of March when they 
witnessed the rapidly increasing number of infections and the 
declaration of a national emergency by the President—that the 
pandemic was largely a problem occurring outside the country 
and that it was not, therefore, necessary to make serious 
                                                          
 312. Gen. Theory, supra note 46, at 446 (“[J]udicial reform would not be as 
effective where only a small minority of the population uses the court for dispute 
resolution.”). 
 313. See Philip Mirvis, Reflections: US Coronavirus Crisis Management—
Learning from Failure Donald Trump and More, January—April, 2020, 20 J. 
CHANGE MGMT. 283 (2020) (recounting former-President Trump’s “alarmist” 
labeling of coronavirus warnings and partial travel ban that permitted 40,000 
travelers to and from China amidst the crisis). 
 314. Proclamation 9984, supra note 92, §§ 1–2 (suspending entry from 
China). 
 315. See Mirvis, supra note 313, at 293–94 (“A key challenge was to come to 
grips with the healthcare system’s supply chain with projected shortages of 
hospital beds, breathing ventilators, masks, and other personal protective 
equipment.”). 
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preparations for COVID-19.316 Until mid-March, the federal 
government did not issue any mandate or guideline for public 
compliance. 
This complacency was turned into pressing stress on the 
public in the following sequence. The government had been 
unsuccessful in conducting a sufficient number of tests and 
contact tracing, consequently failing to contain the spread of the 
pandemic. As a result, the number of infections and the death 
toll skyrocketed from late February to early March.317 
Unprepared to handle the pandemic, states resorted to the most 
drastic measures, such as stay-at-home orders and non-essential 
business closures, to contain the spread of the disease.318 These 
measures appear to have stabilized the rate of infections by mid-
April but exerted considerable economic, psychological, and 
social pressure on the public, as demonstrated by public 
objections and mass protests.319 When states started to lift stay-
at-home orders and re-open businesses in late April,320 the 
federal government issued guidelines for re-opening but without 
any mandate on essential measures, such as mask mandates.321 
                                                          
 316. See, e.g., JOHN STERNFELD, UNPREPARED: AMERICA IN THE TIME OF 
CORONAVIRUS (2020) (tracing the trajectory of the development of the 
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WASH. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar
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the number of infection cases). 
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 320. Alaa Elassar, This is Where Each State is During Its Phased Reopening, 
CNN (May 27, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/us/states-reopen-c
oronavirus-trnd/ [https://perma.cc/MV94-SJF7]. 
 321. Alana Wise, READ: White House Guidelines to States for Reopening, 
NPR (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/16/836489480/read-white-ho
use-guidelines-to-states-for-reopening [https://perma.cc/7JNQ-KNCN]. There is 
controversy as to whether the federal government has the authority to impose 
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Varied state and local mandates, sometimes in conflict with one 
another,322 created a sub-optimal environment for public 
compliance with the measures adopted by state and local 
governments. 
Under such an environment, public compliance with mask 
mandates, which is one of the most important measures to 
prevent the spread of the disease, has varied by region, with the 
most compliant areas in the Northeast and along the West 
Coast, and lower levels of compliance in the Plains and the 
South.323 There is no federal, national mask mandate in place,324 
but the CDC recommends that all individuals over two years of 
age wear a mask in a public setting or around people who live in 
a separate household.325 The number of American adults 
wearing masks has been increasing; in June of 2020 only 65 
percent of American adults reported regularly wearing face 
                                                          
a federal mask mandate. The government may invoke Section 361 of the Public 
Health Service Act (PHSA), which grants the federal government the authority 
to make and enforce regulations necessary “to prevent the introduction, 
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into 
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 325. Guidance for Wearing Masks; Help Slow the Spread of COVID-19, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.cdc.go
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masks in public, but that number increased to 85 percent within 
the first two weeks of August.326 
In the context of the proposed reform, the public is expected 
to show support and compliance with the law that requires the 
government to ensure timely public access to testing and 
treatment, as they are the beneficiary of the law reform. 
However, regulatory compliance may become an issue for the 
implementation of a law that requires timely contact tracing and 
isolation of COVID-19 patients. Those subject to contact tracing 
for exposure to infection will have to disclose the personal 
information required for contact tracing. Some may not be 
willing to disclose personal information. This means that 
participation in contact tracing may have to be incentivized; 
compulsion may not be effective and may only backfire where a 
culture emphasizing privacy prevails. Forms of incentives may 
include granting a priority for treatment. 
As for the proposed treatment in isolation, some of the 
asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic COVID-19 patients may 
not accept mandatory isolated treatment in public facilities for 
days (i.e., five to ten days until they test negative) and may resist 
involuntary separation from their families and removal from 
their homes,327 even if it is necessary to contain the disease. An 
incentive offer, such as full coverage of the cost of the isolated 
treatment by the government, may improve compliance. 
Additional incentives, such as job protection during the period of 
isolation, care arrangements for the patient’s minor children and 
elderly parents, and a guarantee for hospital admission if the 
patient’s condition deteriorates while staying at the treatment 
center, could also be offered to improve compliance, although 
offering the latter incentive might be difficult in places where 
hospitals are reaching capacity. Also possible is an opt-out 
option, under which the patient is allowed to make their own 
arrangements for isolation if they demonstrate to the 
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 327. See Choi et al., supra note 19 (detailing the use of Community 
Treatment Centers in South Korea); see also Gonsalves et al., supra note 215, 
at 3 (“Individuals will not cooperate with self-isolation or other voluntary social 
distancing measures if they are unable to provide for themselves and their 
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government that they can meet the criteria for effective 
isolation. In the latter case, a monitoring system should also be 
in place. Similar compliance issues may also arise for the 
monitored quarantine of those who have not tested positive but 
were exposed to the risk of infection and the public release of 
some of the private information acquired through contact 
tracing; some incentives might be necessary to enhance 
regulatory compliance. 
C. QUALITY OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Lastly, the proposed reform is assessed against the last 
element under the regulatory impact mechanisms, quality of 
implementation, which “refers to the act of a state meeting the 
requirements of law and undertaking mandates under the terms 
of law to fulfill its objectives.”328 As discussed above, state 
capacity and political will are essential elements that determine 
the quality of implementation.329 
1. State Capacity 
The United States has the world’s largest state capacity for 
the implementation of law:330 with its vast financial, 
technological, and administrative resources, the federal 
government has greater capacity than any other government to 
meet the requirement of the proposed reform, which mandates 
that the government ensure timely public access to TCQT, 
including setting up CTC-type facilities for the isolated 
treatment of all COVID-19 patients. 
The proposed amendment will require financial, 
administrative, and technical resources to ensure the sufficient 
supply of test kits, PPE, vaccines, medicines, and care facilities, 
and to collect and release pertinent information promptly. State 
and local governments may not have sufficient resources to 
undertake these tasks, but the federal government can cooperate 
with state and local authorities to implement the proposed 
amendment across the country. 
As for the proposed Commission, it is also well within the 
state capacity of the United States to establish such a 
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Commission and support its activities: logistical requirements to 
set up such a Commission, such as the creation of an extensive 
communications facility, and providing the head agency with 
necessary financial, technical, and administrative resources will 
not likely be a challenge to the state capacity of the United 
States. The proposed Commission will have to coordinate with 
state and local health authorities in the implementation of its 
policies. The resources at the disposal of the federal government 
will likely be sufficient to support such coordination. A more 
likely challenge to implement the proposed reform will be a 
political one, rather than state capacity, as further discussed 
below. 
2. Political Will  
Political will, another important element to determine the 
quality of implementation, may prove to be an issue. The 
magnitude of the unprecedented health crisis requires 
extraordinary political leadership at the federal, state, and local 
levels for successful management. Indeed, effective political 
leadership has guided populations in other countries that have 
better managed COVID-19.331 Such political leadership has been 
lacking in the United States, particularly at the federal level 
under the Trump administration. Traditionally, Presidents have 
accepted political responsibility and exercised leadership during 
periods of crisis.332 However, the Trump administration failed to 
show such leadership for the management of COVID-19: the 
administration initially downplayed the seriousness of the 
pandemic and delegated the management responsibilities 
largely to state and local governments.333 As discussed above, 
the pandemic is a national and international emergency. As 
such, it requires a national response with national (federal) 
leadership, and state and local initiatives are insufficient to 
overcome the crisis. 
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The sharp partisan divide in United States politics, which 
has been deepening for decades, as well as former President 
Trump’s dismissive attitude about the pandemic, contributed to 
the lacking federal leadership. As this President had been 
elected without majority support from the population,334 he 
displayed innate limits on his ability to unite Americans for a 
common cause. A majority of his supporters were concentrated 
in the midwestern and southern regions of the United States, 
rather than the population and economic centers on the eastern 
and western coasts.335 This divide, again coupled with Trump’s 
negative attitudes and failures, created confrontations and gaps 
between the administration on the one hand and the economic 
and political elites, mass media, and scientific communities on 
the other, generating an adverse political environment for 
building a united frontline against COVID-19. The divide not 
only existed at the federal level but also permeated into the state 
and local levels, as revealed by the confrontations and disputes 
between state and local authorities.336 
Improved leadership would be necessary to introduce an 
effective form of treatment that has been successful in 
containing the pandemic in other countries; for example, South 
Korea introduced the treatment of asymptomatic and mildly 
symptomatic COVID-19 patients in physically isolated 
Community Treatment Centers (CTCs) located throughout the 
country.337 In the United States, such patients do not receive 
medical treatment and are only recommended to self-quarantine 
at home.338 There is no monitoring of quarantine, and the 
patients’ family members and even neighbors are exposed to the 
                                                          
 334. 2016 US Presidential Election Map by County & Vote Share, BRILLIANT 
MAPS (Nov. 29, 2016), https://brilliantmaps.com/2016-county-election-map/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/U8YD-B2BR]. 
 335. Snopes, Counting Blue Counties, in THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 
46, at 118, n.610; see also Brilliant Maps, supra note 334 (showing vote share 
by county for the 2016 United States presidential election). 
 336. See Reimann supra note 108; Chiu, supra note 109 (discussing disputes 
and disagreements between state and local authorities). 
 337. See Choi et al., supra note 19 (detailing South Korea’s use of 
Community Treatment Centers). 
 338. See Coronavirus (COVID-19), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.h
tml [https://perma.cc/5EZJ-6HUG] (directing individuals with symptoms of 
COVID-19 to quarantine). 
2021] MANAGING COVID-19 71 
 
risk of infection, depending on how quarantine is done by the 
individual. Self-quarantine has limits and, coupled with the 
failure to conduct contact tracing in the early stages of the 
pandemic, contributed to the rapid spread of the pandemic. In 
contrast, South Korea was able to operate CTCs where COVID-
19 patients were admitted, isolated from the rest of the 
population, except medical personnel, and received medical 
treatment and transferred to hospitals when necessary.339 
Patients were released once they no longer tested COVID 
positive. 
The isolated treatment of all COVID-19 patients was a core 
reason for South Korea’s success in containing the disease. 
South Korea has been unsuccessful in securing the sufficient 
amount of vaccines in time due to late negotiations but has still 
been able to control the number of infections and deaths340 well 
below hospital capacity thanks to effective TCQT: CTCs have 
been set up by converting accommodation facilities, and the 
government assumed the cost of testing and treatment at CTCs. 
The introduction of this system will be instrumental to contain 
the disease, but substantial political leadership will be required 
to persuade COVID-19 patients with mild or no symptoms to 
stay for days in an isolated place, where many may not feel 
comfortable with this type of isolated treatment, even with the 
aforementioned incentives. It also takes considerable political 
leadership to secure facilities to convert to CTC-type treatment 
centers and make an arrangement for the cost reimbursement of 
accommodation and treatment under the private healthcare 
system, unlike South Korea with its prevailing public healthcare 
system.341 The proposal will indeed be politically challenging, 
but effective leadership, which facilitates the isolated treatment 
for all COVID-19 patients, will result in saving lives. 
Vaccination is also important to save lives and contain the 
disease, but as mentioned, as of this writing, nearly half the 
population has not been fully vaccinated, and over 40 percent of 
the population has not yet received a single dose.342 Those who 
object to vaccination for reasons including political ones may 
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well resist and challenge the proposed financial incentives 
linked to the Coronavirus Tax Relief and Payments as 
unacceptable discrimination against them. Political leadership 
will be required to implement such incentives over political 
challenges and persuade a significant number of the population 
still resisting or avoiding vaccination to get vaccinated for their 
own protection and the protection of others. It remains to be seen 
whether the new Biden administration will be able to exercise 
such political leadership and increase vaccination. 
Concerning the proposed legal reform, the federal 
administration may for political considerations not welcome a 
legal requirement to take mandatory steps to prepare for the 
pandemic in pre-defined timelines: the administration may well 
consider such a requirement to undermine its political discretion 
by reducing its political options in the pandemic situation. As 
discussed above, the Trump administration initially downplayed 
the seriousness of the pandemic, as demonstrated by lack of 
timely preparations, due to the pandemic’s adverse effect on his 
re-election in November of 2020.343 The proposed legal 
requirement will remove such an expedient political option 
relating to the management of the pandemic. The libertarian-
minded administration may also consider the part of the 
proposed law that requires timely quarantine and isolated 
treatment of COVID-19 patients, as well as mandatory contact 
tracing and public release of some of the private information 
acquired through contact tracing, as exceeding the bounds of 
governmental authority and politically unsupportable, even if 
the federal government may have legal authorities.344 The 
administration, therefore, may lack the political will to support 
and implement the proposed legal reform. 
As for the proposed Commission, the administration may 
also consider such a Commission to be adversarial to its political 
interest; the politically independent head agency will not be 
subject to the control of the President, at least not directly, and 
may develop policies, guidelines, and mandatory measures 
without political considerations favoring the administration. 
The proposed system of coordination will also create direct 
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channels of cooperation and coordination with federal, state, and 
local authorities, which is to be headed by this politically 
independent agency; the administration may consider such a 
system as weakening its influence and control over the pandemic 
response. Thus, implementing the proposed law and 
institutional reform will require a federal administration with a 
strong political will to set up an optimal legal and institutional 
framework for the welfare of the people, rather than one 
embedded in a partisan political interest. 
V. CONCLUSION 
COVID-19 represents an unprecedented public health 
failure in the United States, causing over 44.8 million infections 
and over 720,000 deaths in less than two years of the 
pandemic.345 The infection of former President Trump with 
COVID-19 was a symbolic testament to this failure; the former 
President, who was expected to lead the national effort to combat 
COVID-19, failed to comply with safety guidelines, such as 
wearing face masks in public, and downplayed the seriousness 
of the pandemic for his re-election concerns,346 instead of 
encouraging the public to follow guidelines and cooperate with 
public health authorities. The former President may have 
recovered from the disease within only a few days, thanks to the 
state-of-the-art facilities and the then-experimental medicine 
made available to him, but other COVID-19 patients not in such 
a privileged position were dying by the thousands daily. The 
daily death toll has been reduced since then, but still hundreds 
of COVID-19 patients are losing their lives daily, and over 40 
percent of the population in the United States remains 
unvaccinated at the time of writing.347 
Many lives would have been saved had the federal 
government ensured public access to TCQT in the early stages 
of the pandemic. Several factors other than the conduct of the 
government, such as system of governance, institutional 
frameworks, public compliance, technological environment, and 
healthcare system structure, have affected the country’s 
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readiness for the pandemic. Among these factors, the United 
States healthcare system, which is unique among the high-
income countries as reliant on job-based private health 
insurance, limited access to testing and treatment for tens of 
millions of Americans, who were either uninsured or under-
insured, due to concerns about the cost,348 particularly in the 
earlier weeks of the pandemic when immediate testing and 
treatment were crucial for containing the disease. Subsequent 
COVID-19 legislation relieved some of this cost burden, 
including the cost of testing and vaccination,349 but provisions 
for the cost of treatment remain variant by states and localities. 
There is a call for overhauling the current healthcare system; 
scholars advocate for a single-payer system that has been 
instrumental to securing unfettered public access to testing and 
treatment in other countries adopting that system.350 
The politicization of the COVID-19 response has also 
impeded efforts to control the disease. In the center of the 
controversy lies former President Trump’s unsupportive 
attitude about state and local efforts to contain the disease, such 
as stay-at-home orders, business closures, and mask mandates, 
which had the effect of encouraging his supporters to defy them 
in mass protests.351 The fragmented authorities among federal, 
state, and local governments in COVID-19 management also 
caused open disputes, disagreements, and even lawsuits among 
them, creating further confusion among the public.352 The 
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vertical division of governmental power may be an essential 
feature of the United States federal system, but this divisive 
fragmentation has harmed pandemic management throughout 
the country. With insufficient coordination among federal, state, 
and local governments, the current practice has proved to be 
ineffective in controlling a pandemic of national and 
international scale. 
The timely collection and public release of the information 
pertinent to COVID-19, including some information acquired 
through contact tracing information, is essential for the public 
to stay informed and protect themselves from the pandemic. The 
government largely failed to provide public access to such 
information, particularly in the crucial first few weeks of the 
pandemic.353 While there is a public interest in securing access 
to the information, a concern for privacy over the collection and 
release of personal information also exists,354 along with a risk 
of misuse by a third party or by the government.355 Steps must 
be taken to protect privacy and prevent misuse, but striking an 
adequate balance between the public need for information and 
the right to privacy is not always straightforward. On account of 
the unprecedented public health crisis, there is a call for 
reinforcing the public interests in the collection and release of 
information. 
This article proposes legal and institutional reforms to 
ensure timely public access to TCQT. Legal and institutional 
prescriptions cannot eliminate the adverse influence of politics, 
but these prescriptions, at a minimum, offer a blueprint that 
guides the government where rule of law prevails. A core 
element of the proposed reform is amending existing law to not 
only empower, but also to require the federal government, with 
vast financial, technological, and administrative resources at its 
disposal, to take mandatory steps to ensure public access to 
TCQT in pre-defined timelines and to promptly provide the 
public with all pertinent information necessary to prevent the 
spread of disease.356 The proposed reform also includes the 
establishment of a bi-partisan Commission, headed by a 
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politically independent agency in charge of controlling infectious 
diseases. The proposed Commission will be responsible for the 
development of policies and implementation of measures in 
systematic coordination with federal, state, and local 
governments, as well as the private sector. The practice adopted 
by the former Trump administration, which defers to the 
discretion of a federal administration that failed to take timely 
steps due to political considerations and to state and local 
governments with limited resources and personnel, to manage 
the pandemic on their own, is simply untenable for a future 
pandemic. 
 
 
 
